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INTRODUCTION
The fully competent, culpable, and malevolent Spike azttacks
Mother Beneficence with a tire iron in order to steal the alms she
has collected for the poor. Mother Beneficence defends herself by
kicking Spike in the shins, and Dudley Doright rushes to her
rescue, punching Spike in the nose, knocking him to the ground,
and holding him until the police arrive. Dudley acts solely for the
purposes of preventing harm to Mother Beneficence and bringing
Spike to justice.
Both Mother Beneficence and Dudley fulfill the offense
elements for assault in that they purposely cause bodily injury to
another human being.' Most readers, jurors, and theorists would
probably agree, however, that they are justified in their actions. The
Model Penal Code (MPC) provides justification defenses of
self-defense for Mother Beneficence and defense-of-others for

1. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(a) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (defiming
assault as the purposeful, knowing, or reckless infliction of bodily injury).
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Dudley.2 These defenses would not only exempt Mother
Beneficence and Dudley from punishment, they would also ratify
their defensive force as correct under the circumstances. 3
The general characterization of justification defenses as
affirmative criminal defenses that ratify the defendant's conduct as
acceptable under the circumstances, despite fulfilling all offense
elements for some criminal offense, is widely accepted. This
formulation distinguishes justification defenses from excuses which
exempt the defendant from punishment due to some disability but
do not mark the defendant's conduct as acceptable under the
circumstances.4
Although this broad framework is well-settled, important
disputes remain regarding the appropriate classification of hard
cases, the parameters of specific justification defenses and of the
general category, the moral and conceptual foundations of these
defenses, and their significance for the duties and rights of third
parties. The defense of duress exemplifies some of these problems
in that it is a particularly difficult defense to clearly classify as
either a justification or an excuse.
This Article examines the central theoretical issues and difficult
cases raised in the contemporary debate regarding justification
defenses. The Article also advances a theoretical framework which
accommodates these difficult cases and clarifies the parameters of
this category of defense. It provides a foundation for this class of
defenses in the broader structure of criminal offenses and defenses
and in the moral condemnation inherent in criminal punishment. As
part of the process of articulating a theory of justification defenses,
the Article explores the boundaries that separate justifications from
related legal categories, including excuse and mitigation. It does
not attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of criminal
2. Id. §§ 3.04, 3.05 (justifying force necessary to protect oneself or another from unlawful
force).
3. G.P. FLErcHER, REntNIoNG CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) [hereinafter RETHINKING]; P.
ROBINSON, CRIMNNAL LAW DEFENSES § 24(a) (1984) [hereinafter DEFENSES].
4.
RHINKiNa, supra note 3, at 759; DEFENSES; supra note 3, §§ 24, 25 (identifying
justified conduct as at least acceptable); see infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text (discussing the

debate among those who consider it only acceptable and those who consider such behavior right or
commendable).
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defenses; however, it addresses these related issues only insofar as
doing so advances the primary purpose of articulating the contours
of justification defenses.5
This project pursues both analytic and normative goals. It is
analytic insofar as it explicates the broad principles of justification
embodied in contemporary American criminal law, but it does not
attempt to defend every aspect of current doctrine. It pursues a
normative aim in that it advances and defends a theory of
justification defenses, including some provisions which would alter
current doctrine.
The argument proceeds in the following manner: Section I
examines the contemporary debate among criminal law theorists
regarding justification defenses. Section I does not defend the
position advanced by any of the theorists, but rather, identifies the
most contentious issues and cases in the contemporary debate.
Section II advances a positive theory of justification defenses and
demonstrates that it can accommodate these critical issues and
difficult cases in a manner that integrates justifications with the
broader purposes and moral foundations of the criminal law.
Section II addresses the defense of duress in a manner consistent
with this theory, advocating an interpretation of duress as
systemically complete mitigation which should generate purely
vindicating convictions. The theoretical framework advanced in
sections II and III provides a structure for the analysis of
justification defenses as part of an integrated system of criminal
law. This theory calls upon the condemnation inherent in criminal
conviction and punishment, the prospective and retrospective
functions of justifications, and the distinction between internal and
external justification as broad organizing principles.

5.

1236
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I. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
A. The Context
In order to establish the guilt of a defendant for a criminal
offense in contemporary American criminal law, the state must
prove that the defendant fulfilled the material elements of the
offense as defined in the relevant criminal code. 6 The MPC defines
offenses in a manner that includes both objective offense elements
stated in the form of conduct, circumstances, or results and
culpability elements. 7 One commits assault, for example, by
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to
another human being.' "Causing bodily injury to another human
being" constitutes the objective offense elements for assault,9 and
"purposely, knowingly, or recklessly" represents the culpability
element.'" In addition, the conduct constituting the offense must
include a voluntary act as defined in the MPC."
Defendants may offer several types of defenses in response to
the state's case-in-chief. Defendants advance failure-of-proof
defenses when they attempt to show that the state has failed to
carry its burden of proving one or more offense elements. 2
Defendants can escape liability despite fulfilling all offense

elements by establishing general defenses. For the purposes of this
Article, justifications and excuses are the two categories of general
defenses of primary interest. Those who raise justification defenses
contend that although they have engaged in conduct that fulfills the
material elements of a criminal offense, circumstances render that

6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). The author
will refer to the MPC unless reference to a specific code will enhance clarity.

7.
8.
9.
objective
10.
11.

Id. § 1.13(9).
Id. § 211.1(1).
Id. § 1.13(10) (material elements); see DEFENSES, supra note 3, § I I(a) (differentiating
elements and culpability elements).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (culpability elements).
Id. § 2.01. For a more complete discussion of the structure of offense elements, see R.

SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL REsPONsIBnrY 86-131

(1991).
12. See DEFENSES, supra note 3, §§ 21, 22 (discussing a comprehensive system of defenses
including those addressed here).
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conduct socially acceptable and perhaps even desirable and, thus,
immune from punishment. Excuses, in contrast, address the
accountability of the defendant rather than the acceptability of the
conduct. Those who raise excuses admit that they engaged in
criminal conduct and that this conduct was wrongful in the
circumstances, but they contend that they are not appropriately held
accountable for that behavior due to some disability-based excusing
condition.3
In short, justifications appeal to the special circumstances in
which the ordinarily criminal conduct was performed, and they
exonerate the defendants because the conduct was socially
acceptable under these conditions. These defenses would apply to
any other actor who performed the same conduct in the same
circumstances. Excuses are specific to defendants because they
exculpate these individuals for their criminal conduct due to
disabilities, such as infancy or psychological disorder, that
undermine the attribution of culpability for this particular conduct
to these defendants.
Much of the contemporary discussion of justification defenses
takes the form of a debate between George Fletcher and a series of
critics who raise theoretical criticisms and difficult cases directed
at Fletcher's theory.14 The critics dispute the following
contentions in Fletcher's theory: (1) Justification defenses establish
conduct as right rather than as merely tolerable or permissible; (2)
only defendants who act with awareness of justificatory
circumstances qualify for justification; (3) defendants who commit
criminal conduct with the reasonable but mistaken belief that

13.

RErIIqKNG, supra note 3, at 759; DEFENSES, supra note 3, §§ 24, 25.
Fletcher presents his theory in several sources: RETHINKING, supra note 3; The Right and
the Reasonable,98 Hv.
L. RaV. 949 (1985) [hereinafter The Right and the Reasonable];The Right
to Life, 13 GA. L. REy. 1371 (1979) [hereinafter The Right to Life]; Should Intolerable Prison
Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355 (1979)
[hereinafter Prison Conditions]. The critics include: J. Dressier, New Thoughts about the Concept of
Justificationin the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher'sThinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L.
14.

REV. 61 (1984); K. Greenawalt, DistinguishingJustificationsfrom Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEmP.
PROBS. 89 (1986) [hereinafter Distinguishing]; K. Oreenawalt, On the Perplexing Borders of
Justification and Excuse, 84 COLuM. L. Rnv. 1897 (1984) [hereinafter Perplexing Borders]; P.
Robinson, DEFEN s s, supra note 3.
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justificatory circumstances exist qualify for excuse rather than
justification; (4) justification defenses create a matrix of social
responsibility such that other persons may assist and may not resist
or interfere with justified conduct; (5) this social matrix generates
a corollary incompatibility thesis which holds that no more than
one party in violent confrontation can be justified. The following
subsections examine each of these contentious issues in order to
clarify the parameters of the contemporary debate.
B. Justified Conduct as Right or as Permissible
According to Fletcher's theory, offense definitions proscribe
conduct forbidden by prohibitory norms which constitute morally
coherent imperatives for the society to which the law applies.
Justification defenses provide a license or permission to violate a
general prohibitory norm when certain relatively well defined
conditions indicate that doing so will promote a superior right or
social interest.15 Excuses preclude punishment but excuses are not
equivalent to justifications. 6 Defendants who claim justification
rather than excuse contend that their conduct was right or at least
permissible, whereas defendants claiming excuse allege that,
although their conduct may have been wrong, they should not be
held accountable.1 7 Justification defenses enhance the criminal
justice system's ability to fulfill some of its important functions.
The criminal law provides both a guide for voluntary
self-regulation by individual citizens and criteria for evaluation of
that conduct by other citizens and courts. In order to fulfill these
functions, justifications should identify the right, rather than merely
permissible, option, because doing so enables the individual to
determine the correct behavior under the circumstances." The
criminal law seeks to guide individual decision making in such a
manner as to avoid violent confrontation and, in order to promote

15.
16.
17.
18.

REnHNKNG, supra note 3, at 552-77.
Prison Conditions,supra note 14, at 1359.
RETHzNIG, supra note 3, at 854; The Right to Life, supra note 14, at 1376.
The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 14, at 976-77.
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this purpose, it avoids rules giving rise to inconsistent claims of
rights. Justifications that render the conduct objectively right,
establishing the justified actor's right to perform that conduct,
prevent conflicts among legally sanctioned acts. If the actor has a
right to engage in that conduct, then others have no right to
interfere. Thus, justifications that establish objectively right
conduct, as opposed to merely permissible behavior, avoid
situations in which two parties in conflict might both be
justified. 9
The critics reject the claim that justifications always identify
right conduct which the actor has a right to perform, contending
that justified conduct sometimes includes behavior that is merely
permissible or tolerable."0 The law sometimes allows conduct that
is morally less preferable than available alternatives. Most serious
criminal offenses involve conduct which harms others.
Justifications that alter prohibitory norms by establishing exceptions
sometimes identify types of behavior that are not appropriately
within the scope of the norms because they do not cause harm of
the type proscribed. Some conduct might qualify for exception
because it is not harmful, although it is not beneficial, morally
ideal, or conduct that the actor has a positive right to perform.21
The criminal law does not attempt to promote morally ideal
behavior; rather, it establishes a minimal social morality, leaving
considerable latitude within which individuals can prefer their own
interests over those of others. People can defend themselves with
deadly force in their own homes without retreat, for example, and
in many jurisdictions, they can also do so in public places.
Arguably, this rule provides legal permission for conduct that is
only morally tolerable in that retreat to avoid killing would be the
morally superior option.22 Perhaps the rule allowing the use of
deadly force in self-defense against innocent aggressors provides
more compelling support for the contention that some justified

19.
20.
21.
22.
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Prison Conditions, supra note 14, at 1358-65.
Distinguishing,supra note 14, at 104-05.
Dressier, supra note 14, at 83.
Perplexing Borders,supra note 14, at 1904-07.
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conduct is merely tolerable rather than superior conduct. At the
least, the critics contend, the law ought to be able to provide the
justification while leaving open the question regarding whether
23
such conduct is superior or merely tolerable.
C. Unknowingly Justified Defendants
Fletcher contends that justifications apply only to those who act
with awareness of the justificatory circumstances because
justifications exonerate defendants for violations of general
prohibitory norms, and only those who act with such knowledge
merit exoneration. In some passages, he also seems to demand that
they act for the right reasons in that they must be motivated by the
justifying conditions.24
Paul Robinson contends that current American law reveals no
consensus on the knowledge requirement.' According to
Robinson, case law is rare and approximately equally divided
regarding this issue, and some jurisdictions justify on the basis of
defendants' beliefs regarding justifying conditions while others do
not. Finally, he interprets the MPC provisions that justify
defendants on the basis of their beliefs in the justifying conditions
as intended to include putatively justified defendants rather than to
exclude unknowingly justified ones.
In addition to disputing Fletcher's position as a descriptive
account of current law, the critics support their contention that
justifications ought to be available to unknowingly justified actors
by appeal to the harm preventing function of the criminal law.26
Justification defenses provide exceptions to prohibitory norms for
classes of behavior that do not cause the harm the norms are
intended to prevent, yet the knowledge requirement would deny the
defense to those who do not perform socially harmful conduct as
well as to some who actively prevent the relevant harm.

23.

Dressier, supra note 14, at 84-86.

24. Compare RETIIINMuG, supra note 3, at 562-65; The Right to Life, supra note 14, at
1382-83 with RETHDINo, supra note 3, at 557, 559; The Right to Life, supra note 14, at 1384-85.
25. DEFENSEs, supra note 3, § 122(e).
26. 1& § 122(c); Dressier, supra note 14, at 79.
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Furthermore, the knowledge requirement fails to satisfy
Fletcher's purpose of limiting justifications to those who deserve
them because it would extend the defense to defendants who are
aware of the justifying circumstances but act from vicious motive.
Suppose, for example, that X learns of justifying conditions that
would provide a defense for force exerted against Y. Although X
does not care at all about these justifying circumstances, he takes
advantage of them in order to exercise his longstanding hatred for
Y by shooting Y. The critics deny that X's knowledge merits the
license or permission to violate the prohibitory norm and, thus, that
it can fulfill the function Fletcher attributes to it.'
Kent Greenawalt interprets this problem regarding the
unknowingly justified actor as demonstrating that no clear
parameters can be drawn for the justification defenses because
moral evaluation involves behavior, consequences, and knowledge,
blurring the distinction between justification and excuse." He
offers the hypothetical Ann who attacks Ben out of hate while she
is unknowingly justified because Ben was in the process of setting
a bomb in a crowded place. Ann provides no grounds for excuse,
so her act is either justified or wrongful. Greenawalt contends that
Ann's act seems justified if we concentrate on the consequences,
but unjustified if we focus on her behavior and reason for acting.
He concludes that Ann's action was warranted, although she was
wrong to attack Ben. Finally, Robinson argues that extending
justifications to unknowingly justified actors who act for evil
purposes will not result in gross injustice or social approval of evil
actions because these actors remain liable for criminal attempts.29
D. Putative Justification
Putative justification arises when the actor reasonably but
mistakenly believes that the act is justified. Fletcher argues that

27.
28.
29.

DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 122(e); Dressier, supra note 14, at 80.
Distinguishing,supra note 14, at 95.
See DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 122(d) (discussing attempt liability for those who

demonstrate a willingness to cause harm in circumstances that do not result in a net legal harm).
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putatively justified actors should be excused but not justified
because including these defendants within the scope of justification
would frustrate the violence preventing function of the criminal law
by justifying both parties in violent confrontation under certain
conditions.3 Suppose, for example, that X reasonably but
mistakenly believes that Y is attacking him. If putative justification
justifies, then X is justified in responding with force against Y, and
Y, who is unaware of X's mistaken belief, reasonably but
mistakenly believes that X is unjustifiably attacking her. Thus, Y
is justified by putative justification in responding in kind. As a
result, both parties are justified in engaging in armed combat.
Should the police intervene in this altercation, they would interfere
in mutually justified behavior.
The justificatory approach to putative justification also results
in cases in which the actor is not justified in acting in a manner
that seems intuitively to be clearly justified. Suppose, for example,
that B attacks C because B reasonably but mistakenly believes that
C is attacking her. If putative justification justifies, then B is
justified, and if C is aware of B's mistake, then C is aware that B's
violence against him is justified and, hence, not unlawful. C,
therefore, may not justifiably exert any force in protecting himself
from this unprovoked attack.
For these reasons, Fletcher argues that putative justification
should be interpreted as a mistake based excuse that exculpates the
defendant for the putatively justified conduct but does not render
it lawful.3 With this approach, C can legally defend himself from
B's excused but unlawful conduct. B's conduct does not actually

serve any superior social interest or right that would ground an
exception to the general prohibitory norm and support the matrix
of interlocking social relationships created by a true justification.
Greenawalt resists the attempt to consistently categorize
putatively justified defendants, arguing that some are most

30. REtINKING, supra note 3, at 762-69.
31. Id.; Prison Conditions,supranote 14, at 1361-65; see infra notes 35-44 and accompanying
text (explaining the social matrix and the related set of interlocking social rights and duties).
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appropriately justified rather than excused.32 He cites the example
of a forest ranger who reasonably but erroneously concludes that
he must bum a section of forest in order to create a fire break and
protect a town and its inhabitants from a forest fire. Greenawalt
contends that the ranger should be justified rather than excused
because his choice and action were justified under the
circumstances although the consequences fortuitously were not.
Any choice that is the best that could be expected under the
circumstances should be justified.33
Greenawalt advances cases intended to demonstrate the
significance of defendants' mental states for justification.34 Recall
Ann who strikes Ben out of hatred while she is unknowingly
justified, and compare her to Anna who strikes Bill because she
reasonably but mistakenly believes that he is about to attack her.
If justification is purely a matter of the external circumstances
without regard to perception, then Ann is justified while Anna is
not, yet it seems clear that Ann is blameworthy while Anna is not.
Greenawalt contends that Anna's blameless perception should be
sufficient for justification and that the fact that Ann would be
subject to attempt liability demonstrates that her act was not fully
justified. He concludes that actors who act on a faultless appraisal
of the facts should be justified.
E. The Social Matrix and the Incompatibility Thesis
Fletcher's classification of putative justification as excuse rather
than as justification reflects his claim that justifications identify
conduct that is right despite violating the prohibitory norm. 35 Any
actor would be right to perform such conduct in order to promote
the superior right or social interest that justifies it. Excuses, in
contrast, are specific to the individual because they arise from the
individual's disability rather than from the superior right or interest

32.
33.
34.
35.
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that gives rise to the justification. This foundation in superior rights
or social interest provides a matrix for a coherent set of
complimentary rights and duties for third parties. If person X is
justified in doing act A because doing act A serves the superior
right or social interest, then any other person Y has a right to assist
and a duty not to resist or interfere with X in doing A because
assisting X will promote the justificatory right or social interest and
resisting or interfering will frustrate that right or interest.3 6 That
is, the entire set of related rights and duties cohere with one
another because they share a common foundation in the superior
social interests and norms that provide the matrix giving form to
all rights and duties in the set.
Fletcher's interpretations of justified conduct as right behavior,
of putative justification as excuse, and of the social matrix all
promote the violence preventing function of law by supporting the
incompatibility thesis, which holds that no more than one party to
a violent confrontation can be justified.37 That is, if a common
justificatory right or social interest provides the underlying matrix
for a set of related rights and duties, that set should cohere in such
a way as to preclude situations in which two or more participants

in violent confrontation with each other have access to legal
justification. If justification defenses apply only to cases in which
justificatory circumstances actually occur, and if third parties have

a duty not to resist justified acts, then situations will not arise in
which two justified parties engage in violent behavior. If X and Y
engage in violent conflict, then each resists or interferes with the
other. If both were justified, then both would be justified in
resisting or interfering with justified actors, in direct contradiction
of the claim that one may not resist or interfere with justified
actions.
However, the claim that the social matrix provides a coherent
set of interlocking duties and responsibilities encounters tension
with Fletcher's knowledge requirement. Suppose X is unknowingly

36. Id. at 761-62; The Right to Life, supra note 14, at 77; Prison Conditions,supra note 14,
at 1357-65.
37. Prison Conditions,supra note 14, at 1357-65.
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justified in killing Y and Z assists X in performing that act with
knowledge of the justifying circumstances. Due to the knowledge
requirement, X has no justification defense, but Z is justified in
assisting X.3 It seems that it is true both that Z is justified and
that he is not. Z is justified in that he acts in furtherance of the
superior social interest with knowledge of the justifying
circumstances, but Z is not justified in that he promotes X's
unjustified action.
Critics advance difficult cases calling both the social matrix and
the incompatibility thesis into question. Joshua Dressler advances
the example in which X is an undercover police officer who
believes mistakenly, but with probable cause, that Y is a mass
murderer."' X draws his gun and approaches Y in order to arrest
her. Before X has an opportunity to identify himself as a police
officer, Y sees X draw his gun and reasonably but mistakenly
concludes that X is about to attack her. Dressier contends that it is
at least arguable that under these circumstances Y is justified in
defending herself from the apparent deadly attack, and X is
justified in defending himself from Y's exercise of force. This
example suggests that, contrary to the incompatibility thesis, both
parties in a violent conflict might be justified when both act on
mistaken perceptions.
Dressier advances other cases that raise doubts about the
incompatibility thesis and contends that the resolution of these
cases may vary with the underlying moral theory.4" Suppose, for
example, that X and Y are both swimming from their sinking ship
toward the only available plank that is floating in the water. It is
sufficient to keep either of them afloat, but not both. Dressler
contends that it is at least arguable that each party is justified in
fighting for her life by preventing the other from gaining the plank.
He advances another example which he interprets as a conflict

38.

See Dressier, supra note 14, at 95-96 (suggesting that we might avoid contradiction here

by interpreting X's status as that of one who is justified but lacks standing to assert the defense). If
.this is true, we need some clarification of the relevant notion of standing and of its place in the larger
theory.
39. Perplexing Borders,supra note 14, at 1904.
40. Dressier, supra note 14, at 88-89.
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between irreducible values.41 Suppose X can save 1000 innocent
children only by killing the innocent Y. Dressier contends that one
could plausibly conclude that X would be justified in killing Y and
that Y would be justified in exerting deadly force against X in
self-defense. Thus, both sides in the violent conflict would be
acting rightly.
Greenawalt advances actual (as opposed to hypothetical) cases
in which he claims both sides in violent conflict might be
justified.42 In People v. Young, the defendant Young intervened in
an apparent mugging that was actually a legal arrest in progress.43
Young was arguably justified in that he should be praised rather
than blamed for his decision and in that society should encourage
people to make similar decisions when confronted with similar
information. Yet, the police who violently resisted Young's
intervention were also justified in doing so, and society should
generally encourage police to resist those who interfere in legal

arrests by police officers. Greenawalt presents a similar analysis of
prison escape cases in which prisoners might be justified in
escaping in order to avoid some imminent violence and prison
guards might also be justified in fulfilling their responsibilities by
preventing those prisoners from escaping. While Dressier interprets
his incompatible justification cases as reflecting tensions among
underlying moral theories, principles, and values, Greenawalt
explains them as manifestations of the complex process of
justifying decisions and acts in light of the information
available.'
F. Duress as a Problematic Classification
The defense of duress constitutes a problematic category for
any attempt to systematically classify justifications and excuses

41.
42.
43.
44.
1919-21.

Id. at 89-91.
Perplexing Borders,supra note 14, at 1919-21.
People v. Young, 183 N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1962), rev'g 210 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1961).
Compare Dressier, supra note 14, at 87-91 with Perplexing Borders,supra note 14, at
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because it contains elements that are ordinarily attributed to
each.45 Duress is frequently classified as an excuse, but it often
includes an objective component such as the MPC's "person of
reasonable firmness. 4 6 Cases, codes, and commentators vary,
addressing duress as an excuse, a justification, or some hybrid
combination.47 Under the MPC, some cases could fall under both
the choice of evils justification and the duress excuse.4"
G. Summary
The debate among Dressier, Fletcher, Greenawalt, and Robinson
emphasizes the following theoretical issues, with accompanying
examples of difficult cases:
(1) Right or Permissible: Do justifications render conduct right
or do they include merely permissible or tolerable behavior?
1.1
X exercises deadly force in self-defense against Y in
X's house without retreating.
1.2
X exercises deadly force in self-defense against Y
who is an innocent aggressor.
(2) The Knowledge Requirement: Must defendants be aware of
the justifying circumstances in order to be eligible for the defense,
or are justifications purely objective in the sense that they are
determined by the presence of the justifying circumstances
independent of the actor's awareness?
2.1
The unknowingly justified X attacks Y out of hate.
(Greenawalt's Ann).
(3) Putative Justification: Does putative justification establish
a justification, an excuse, or either one depending on other

conditions?
45. See infra notes 182-244 and accompanying text (discussing duress and its categorization
in a system of defenses).
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); Perplexing
Borders, supra note 14, at 1916-17.
47. 3. Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searchingfor its
ProperLimits, 62 S.CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1349-67 (1989) (discussing the various interpretations of
the defense of duress). ,
48. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3.02 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (choice
of evils and duress, respectively); Perplexing Borders,supra note 14, at 1912-13.
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3.1

X attacks Y out of the reasonable but mistaken
belief that Y is attacking X. (Greenawalt's Anna).
3.2
X burns a section of forest in the reasonable but
mistaken belief that doing so is necessary to save a
town and its inhabitants from a forest fire.
3.3
X and Y attack one another out of the mutually
mistaken but reasonable beliefs that doing so is
necessary to defend their lives.
(4) The Social Matrix: Do justifications consistently accompany
third party rights and duties such that others may assist justified
actors but may not resist or interfere with them?
4.1
Unknowingly justified X kills Y with Z's knowingly
justified assistance: X is not justified; Z is both
justified and unjustified.

(5)Incompatibility Thesis: Can two or more parties in violent
confrontation be justified in exercising force?
5.1
X attacks Y out of the mistaken but reasonable
belief that Y is attacking a third party and Y
responds with force because X is interfering with a
lawful arrest. (NY Young case).
5.2
Prisoner X justifiably escapes in order to avoid
imminent violence and Guard Y lawfully uses force
to prevent X's escape. (Prison escape cases).
5.3
X and Y, swimming from a sinking ship, contest
possession of the sole remaining plank.
5.4
X attempts to kill the innocent Y to save 1000
innocents, and Y attempts to kill X in self-defense.
(6) Duress: Can duress be consistently categorized as either a
justification or an excuse?
Section II advances a theory of justification defenses which
addresses these issues and accommodates most of these difficult
cases. Section I[ proposes an interpretation of duress as a separate
type of claim which differs from both justification and excuse, and
which provides a satisfactory resolution to the remaining cases.
These sections refer to the difficult cases identified in this summary
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by number. "Case 2.1," for example, refers to the case of the
unknowingly justified Ann who attacks out of hate.
II. THE PosmvE THEORY OF JUSTIFCATION
A. Right or Permissible
Fletcher supports his contention that justified conduct is right
rather than merely permissible with several arguments. Justified
cannot mean merely not liable to punishment because excused
conduct is not punishable, yet it is not justified. As an ideal guide
for individual conduct, the law should provide a right answer for
each situation. If justified conduct is objectively right, the actor has
a right to do it and, thus, others have a duty not to interfere. This
formulation promotes the purpose of law by avoiding mutually
justified violent conflicts. If justified conduct were merely
permissible, however, two or more permissible alternatives might
conflict, leading to incompatible justifications. 49 Although these
arguments support the interpretation of justified conduct as right
rather than merely permissible, difficulties remain for this
approach.
Fletcher explicitly contends that justified conduct is right rather
than merely permissible or tolerable, but he does not specify a

precise interpretation of "right." In one sense, the right act might
be understood as the morally best or ideal act. Some teleological
moral theories identify the right act as that act which is such that
no available alternative is superior.5" Justification defenses that
identified the right act in this sense would provide the ideal
guidance Fletcher seeks in that they would direct the individual
toward the best action in the circumstances.

49. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text (providing a more complete discussion of
the claims summarized here).
50. W. FRANKENA, ETHIcs 14 (2d ed. 1973); D. RUNES, DIC'nONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 272
(1962) (explaining teleological theories and the criteria of rightness in those theories).
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As the critics have argued, however, the criminal law generally
proscribes harmful acts rather than prescribing ideal conduct. 51 As
a set of specific behavioral directives, the criminal law provides
minimal standards rather than ideals of aspiration. If justification
defenses identified the morally best conduct, then it would be
impossible to surpass the standard set by the justification by
foregoing the justified behavior. Yet, under some circumstances,
those who refrain from acting on available justifications behave in
an heroic, rather than substandard, manner. Suppose, for example,
police officer X enters a house to investigate reported gun fire. X
encounters a six-year old Y who has found a loaded gun and killed
his sister, apparently unaware that they are not playing a game.
When X enters the room, Y laughs, points the gun at X, and begins
to pull the trigger. X may justifiably shoot Y in self-defense, but
if X refrains from shooting, choosing instead to risk lethal injury
to himself rather than harming the dangerous but innocent Y, most
observers would praise X for heroically rising above the standard
set by the law. It seems, therefore, that one can sometimes exceed
the standard set by justification defenses, precluding the
interpretation of "right" as the morally ideal.52
Alternately, one might interpret "right" as morally obligatory.
On this interpretation, right conduct is that which one not only may
do but also that which one has a duty to do. 53 This interpretation
differs from that which was just discussed because morally
obligatory conduct does not necessarily coincide with the best
conduct. According to some views, the morally best conduct may
be superogatory rather than obligatory. Only a relatively less
demanding level of conduct is required.54 Individuals are not,
however, obliged to take advantage of justifications. The police
officer described previously altruistically forgoes an available

51. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which the criminal law
allows acceptable rather than ideal behavior).
52. This case is an example of the type ofcase listed supra in the summary of § I as 1.2. A
parallel analysis can be presented for those cases listed as 1.1.

53.

See I1OXFORD ENGuSH DICTIONARY 2547 (compact ed. 1977) (including the required

or necessary way as one definition of "right').

54.

See RuNEs, supra note 50, at 306 (explaining the notion of superogatory conduct as that

which exceeds the morally required or expected level of performance).
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justification, and other actors may refuse to exercise available
justifications for reasons of self-interest rather than of morally or
socially superior interest. Suppose X observes Y snatching Z's
purse. X is in a position to tackle Y in order to prevent the theft
and would be justified in doing so." X steps aside rather than risk
injury in the confrontation. X refrains from exercising the
justification, yet X does not violate an obligation, barring some
independent duty to come to Y's aid.
One might interpret right action as including all action that is
not wrongful by the appropriate standard. Legally right action,
according to this interpretation, includes all action that is not
illegal. Although Fletcher apparently would prefer a more stringent
formulation of right, this interpretation meets his demand that right
mean more than merely not liable to punishment.56 Excuses and
non-exculpatory policy defenses, such as diplomatic immunity,
preclude punishment of the defendants who establish them, but they
do not render the offensive conduct permissible. 57 The law
expressly condemns the conduct performed by defendants
exculpated under these types of defenses and attempts to prevent
repetition through provisions designed to remove these defendants
from society or to control their behavior. Insanity defense statutes,
for example, provide for post acquittal commitment, and defendants
who establish diplomatic immunity are subject to restraint,
expulsion, trial and punishment in their own country, or
punishment in the host country if the represented country waives
immunity. 58 Thus, actors who establish these types of defenses are
not liable to punishment, but the conduct for which they have a
defense remains illegal rather than permissible.

55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05(1) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (justifying
force necessary to protect others).
56. Prison Conditions, supra note 14, at 1359.
57. See DEFENSEs, supra note 3, § 201 (discussing non-exculpatory defenses as those based
on policy considerations other than lack of defendant culpability); id. § 203 (discussing diplomatic
immunity as a defense of this category).
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (insanity defense
disposition); DEFENsES, supra note 3, § 203(c) (discussing the practical effects of diplomatic

immunity).
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Fletcher's theory contains the seed from which one can
explicate the formulation of justified conduct as permissible. He
interprets justifications as modifying prohibitory norms by creating
exceptions.59 Excuses and non-exculpatory policy defenses merely
exempt certain defendants from punishment without modifying the
prohibitory norms. Prohibitory norms direct those subject to the
norms to refrain from engaging in certain types of conduct. These
directives take the following form: 'You may not perform acts of
type A,' where the type of act is defined in terms of the conduct
or consequences prohibited by the offense definition. Justification
defenses create exceptions to these norms by specifying certain
circumstances under which the directives do not apply. They take
the following form: 'Except when circumstances C occur.' Thus,
the modified norm reads: 'You may not perform acts of type A,
except under circumstances C,' allowing otherwise prohibited acts
under specified conditions.
The assault provision of the MPC embodies the following
prohibitory norm: 'You may not cause bodily injury to another.'"
The self-defense provision modifies that prohibition by adding the
following exception: 'Except under circumstances such that causing
bodily injury to another person is immediately necessary for the
purpose of protecting yourself against the use of unlawful force by
that other person on the present occasion.' 61 By specifying an
exception to the prohibitory norm under certain circumstances, a
justification defense informs the individual that the norm does not
apply under those circumstances. The norm and justification
together effectively state: 'You may not perform acts of type A,
except that it is not the case that you may not perform acts of type
A when circumstances C obtain.' The phrase, 'it is not the case
that you may not' is the equivalent of 'you may.' It is not the
equivalent of 'you should,' 'you must,' 'it would be best if you
did,' or 'it would be morally ideal if you did.' In short, an

59. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing Fletcher's position).
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(a) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
61. Id. § 3.04(1). The author has omitted "believes" from the MPC provision in order to
reserve the issue ofjustificatory knowledge for the section that addresses that issue. See infra notes
95-163 and accompanying text.
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exception to a prohibitory norm allows individuals to engage in
conduct of the ordinarily proscribed type, but it does not instruct
them to do so or mark conduct of that type as superior or
obligatory.
Justifications grant permission or establish privileges by
specifying exceptions to prohibitory norms. 62 The relationship
among prohibitory norms, offense definitions, and justifications as
exceptions or privileges requires some clarification. If one thinks
that offense definitions constitute prohibitory norms and that
justifications create exceptions to prohibitory norms, then it seems
that justifications create exceptions to offense definitions.
Understood in this manner, all offense definitions seem to contain
an indefinite number of implicit negative offense elements referring
to all possible justificatory circumstances. Justifications then
collapse into failure-of-proof defenses because defendants who
asserts justification defenses appeal to one of these negative
elements, asserting that they did not really commit the offenses
with which they have been charged.
The precise interpretation of these concepts intended by the
theorists discussed remains unclear. This Article integrates the
concepts in the following manner. A prohibitory norm is a broad
statement of principle, providing a broadly applicable moral
imperative in the conventional social morality represented by the
legal system. Offense definitions are more specific legal
applications of the prohibitory norm, drafted with consideration for
other important social principles and policies to give notice, guide
citizens and officials, and articulate the relative severity of various
offenses.
A complete set of offense definitions and applicable
justification defenses would address the entire universe of behavior
relevant to the more abstract moral principles enunciated by
prohibitory norms. A fully articulated prohibitory norm would
include the central moral principle underlying the offense definition
and the various relationships among that principle and the other
principles with which it intersects in the comprehensive

62.
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conventional social morality. This network of intersecting moral
principles supports the legal structure of offense definitions and
justification defenses. 3
According to this interpretation, justifications do not create
implicit exceptions to offense definitions, rendering them failure-ofproof defenses regarding negative elements. Rather, they specify
exceptions to the broad prohibitory norm, granting permission to
violate offense definitions. Understood in this manner, defendants
who fulfill all offense elements for a particular offense under
conditions providing a justification defense commit the offense, but
they are not liable to conviction, punishment, or condemnation
because they have not violated the comprehensive set of norms
underlying the offense definition.
As exceptions to the general prohibitory norms, justification
defenses take the form of privileges rather than rights. If X has a
right to perform act A, then Y has a duty not to interfere with X
performing A. However, if X has only has a privilege to do A,
then, although Y has no legal right to stop X from doing A, Y has
no legal duty to avoid interference with X doing A." That is, if
X has a privilege to do A, X violates no legal right of Y's by
doing A, but Y may legally prevent X from doing A. Privileges
allow parties to compete against each other in certain
circumstances. For example, in ordinary business or athletic
competition, each party pursues some lawful goal while attempting
to prevent the other from achieving it. Thus, the privileges created
by justification defenses render conduct permissible by establishing
exceptions to prohibitory norms, but they do not entail correlative
legal duties to refrain from interfering. Fletcher is correct,
therefore, in stating that if justification defenses render conduct
permissible rather than right, they do not prelude the possibility of
65
conflicting privileges.

63. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (further discussing the criminal law as
embodying a conventional social morality).
64. W.N. Ho HmD, FUNDAMENTAL LEAL CONCEPrONS 38-50 (2d ed. 1978).
65. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Although the mere fact that X has a privilege to engage in
conduct of type A does not create a duty for Y to refrain from
interfering in X's behavior, it does not follow that Y may legally
interfere. Y may have a duty to refrain that arises from other legal
sources. Suppose police officer X causes bodily injury to Z because
Z's resistance to a lawful arrest renders that injury necessary to the
completion of the arrest. X's conduct is justified by the MPC
provision privileging the use of force in law enforcement. 6
Although this privilege does not entail a duty for Y to refrain from
interfering, Y retains the duty to refrain established by other
provisions. Y's duty to refrain arises from the provisions
proscribing assault if Y would interfere in a manner causing bodily
injury or from other offence definitions addressing various methods
of obstructing official functions.67
Those who act on legal privileges, understood as the lack of
any duty to refrain from so acting, may encounter situations in
which they are privileged to act but others are similarly privileged
to resist or interfere with their actions. Perhaps the most obvious
cases arise in legally sanctioned boxing matches in which both
participants are privileged to exercise force against one another and
68
to interfere with one another's exercise of the privilege.
Similarly, those who engage in legally competitive business
practices perform conduct from which they have no duty to refrain
but with which others have no duty to refrain from interfering. Yet,
the methods of all parties in these instances of mutually privileged
competition are limited by all relevant law. Thus, business
enterprises may compete with their competitors, but they may not
do so through violence. The boxers may exercise mutually
privileged violence, but they may not employ weapons. In short, a
statute providing a privilege does not preclude the possibility of
lawful conflict with other legal behavior, but it does not follow that

66.
67.
68.
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all privileged conduct may be interfered with or that those who
may interfere may do so in any manner they chose.6 9
In summary, justification defenses specify exceptions to
prohibitory norms, rendering the justified conduct permissible.
Interpretations of justified conduct as morally ideal, superior, or
obligatory comport neither with the general logical form of
*prohibitory norms and justifications nor with the circumstances in
which they sometimes apply. This formulation of justifications as
creating privileges leaves open the logical possibility of conflicts
between mutually justified actors because the mere fact that
conduct is privileged does not preclude legal interference. In order
to determine whether this formulation generates instances of
mutually justified violent conflict in practice, one must examine the
difficult cases in the context of the larger legal structure.
B. Knowledge and Justification
Fletcher limits justification defenses to those who perform the
proscribed action with awareness of the justificatory circumstances,
and he interprets putative justification as an excuse.7 ° Thus, the
defendant's belief in the existence of the justificatory circumstances

is necessary but not sufficient for justification. This formulation is
logically consistent, but the critics dispute Fletcher's explanation
for the knowledge requirement and advance difficult cases.7 '
Problematic cases include those involving unknowingly justified
defendants and putative justification.
Fletcher's argument for the knowledge requirement from the
premise that only those who act with such knowledge merit the
special exception provided by the defense arguably supports a
requirement of justificatory motive as well as knowledge. The
knowledge condition would make the defense available to actors
who were aware of the justificatory conditions but who acted from

69. See infra notes 137-181 and accompanying text (discussing the social matrix and the
incompatibility thesis).
70. See supra notes 24, 30-31 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the knowledge
requirement).
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vicious motives." Greenawalt raises pivotal cases described
earlier as case 2.1 involving the vicious but unknowingly justified
Ann and 3.1 involving the putatively justified Anna.73 Greenawalt
interprets these cases as demonstrating that no clear line separating
justifications and excuses can be drawn because moral evaluation
addresses behavior, consequences, and knowledge. 74 Consider also
the case of Alice who is both knowingly justified and vicious.
Alice accurately perceives that Bert is about to attack Carol. Alice
cares not a whit about Carol, but she takes advantage of this
opportunity to attack Bert out of hate.
Arguably, common intuitions would hold Anna justified in her
action but not Ann or Alice. Fletcher's theory would deprive Ann
and Anna of the justification but it would provide Anna with an
excuse, while it would justify Alice. Penal codes that base
justifications on the defendants' beliefs or reasonable beliefs about
justificatory conditions would justify Anna and Alice but not
Ann. 75 Finally, codes that recognized actual necessity or beliefs
about necessity as alternative grounds for justification would justify
all three defendants, vesting no significance in the important moral
differences among them. These cases and the perplexing issues of
putative justification and unknowingly justified actors require
consideration of the moral condemnation inherent in criminal
punishment.
C. Moral Condemnation and CriminalPunishment
1. Five Levels of Condemnation in Criminal Punishment
Recall the initial clear case of justification involving Spike,
Mother Beneficence, and Dudley.76 Assume that Spike and
Dudley are both charged with assault. Both fulfill all material

72.
73.

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28, 34 and accompanying text (describing the cases of Ann and Anna).

74.
75.

See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing contention that there is no consensus

on the knowledge requirement).
76. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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elements of the assault offense in that they each purposely cause
bodily injury to another.' Neither suffers any disability that
would ground an excuse. Each is either justified or guilty. Clearly,
Spike is a guilty assailant who deserves punishment, while Dudley
merits a justification defense. In what relevant ways do they differ?
Intuitively, Dudley merits praise for his actions while Spike
deserves condemnation. Joel Feinberg argues that moral
condemnation inheres in the concept of punishment, but the precise
nature and focus of the condemnation expressed by criminal
punishment remains difficult to specify.7" Social institutions of
punishment, including the criminal justice system, consist of rules,
practices, and roles regarding the nature, justification, and
distribution of punishment. Specific applications of the institution
of punishment to a particular person at a particular time constitute
punishment as events. One can address questions regarding the
concept, efficacy, or justification of punishment both at the level
of the institution and at the levels of specific application.79
Adequate understanding of the condemnation expressed by criminal
punishment requires analysis at all levels.
Assume, for example, Spike is tried, convicted, and punished
for his assault on Mother Beneficence. At the first level of
condemnation, the institutional level, the legal system expresses
condemnation of assault by defining it as criminal offense and
prescribing criminal punishment. Modem criminal codes might
include some offenses which are primarily regulatory and relatively
trivial, but the core rules of the criminal law proscribing violations
of person and property express widely accepted moral standards
within the society. 0 By setting minimally acceptable standards of
morally relevant social behavior that correspond at least roughly
with widely accepted moral precepts and by prescribing punishment
for violations, a penal code provides an official representation of

conventional social morality. Thus, provisions prohibiting certain
77.
78.
79.
80.
primarily

MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95-118 (1970).
K. Baler, Is PunishmentRetributive?, 16 ANALYSIS 25, 25-32 (1955).
MODEL PENAL CODEpt. 11 (Official Draft& Revised Comments 1985) (offense definitions
address morally relevant conduct); H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNoCENCE 33 (1976).
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types of behavior as criminal offenses express condemnation of
those types of conduct as contrary to the conventional morality.
At a second level, legal punishment for violations of the penal
code assumes symbolic significance as a social institution for
expressing moral condemnation because it marks the recipient as
one who has violated the official representation of the conventional
social morality. In this manner, the forms of punishment typically
applied to those who violate the core rules of the criminal law
become the paradigmatic symbols of moral condemnation at the
societal level. Execution and imprisonment, for example, take on
special significance as symbols of moral condemnation in a society
that relies on these modes of punishment for serious crimes against
the code.
Criminal punishment as a specific event constitutes an
application of this institution to a particular person at a particular
time for a specific offense. Society applies the institution to the
defendant through the processes of conviction, sentencing, and
execution of the sentence. By convicting Spike of this particular
assault, the jury reaffirms the more abstract institutional
condemnation of this type of conduct."' Condemnation at the third
level extends not only to the general type of behavior proscribed
by the offense definition, but also to this particular instance of that
prohibited type. 2 Thus, the jury's verdict expresses condemnation
of Spike's attack on Mother Beneficence as well as of the general
category of assaultive behavior.
A jury might exculpate Spike under the insanity defense if he
acted while suffering severe psychological disorder.3 Excuses,
81. R.F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential
Significance ofthe Competency to FaceExecution Requirement,51 LA.L. REV. 995,1031-34 (1991).
82. ALVIN GOLDMAN, A THmoRy OF HumAN ACTION 10-15 (1970). Act-types are general
descriptions of certain act-properties that humans can exemplify at a particular time and place. For
example, raising one's hand, standing up, and asking a question are all act-types. Act-tokens are
specific instances of those types by a particular actor at a particular time. For example, Smith's
raising his hand at a particular time is a token of the act-type defined as "raising one's hand."
Similarly, Dudley's punching Spike in the nose at a particular time is a token of the act-type defined

by the MPC's definitions of assault as "purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another." MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1)(a) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
83. ScHOrP, supra note 11, chs. 2-6 (discussing the rationale and function of the insanity
defense).
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including the insanity defense, prevent conviction, but they
undermine neither the institutional condemnation of the general
category of conduct proscribed by the offense definition, the jury's
ratification of this systemic condemnation, nor the jury's
condemnation of this particular assault. Rather, excuses provide the
jury with a method of saying, 'We condemn assaultive behavior in
general and this specific instance of it, but you did not commit this
offense as a responsible agent.' Thus, the insanity defense
exculpates defendants who do not merit condemnation as persons
who have violated the law as accountable agents. In contrast,
conviction and punishment of a fully culpable defendant convey the
fourth level of condemnation of that defendant as one who has
violated the law as a fully accountable agent by the standards of
this criminal justice system.
The fifth type of condemnation expressed by conviction and
punishment in clear cases addresses the defendant as morally
blameworthy for wrongful conduct. Absent a finding of severe
psychological disorder or some other disability giving rise to an
excusing condition, the jury would convict Spike as morally
blameworthy. That is, Spike is not only appropriately called to
account by systemic standards, he is also morally blameworthy in
the eyes of the jury. 4
In summary, conviction and punishment of a fully culpable
defendant for committing a criminal offense and violating a widely
accepted moral standard expresses' condemnation of five different
types at two levels of analysis. First, the offense definition
condemns a certain type of conduct at the institutional level by
proscribing that type of behavior and prescribing criminal
punishment. The second through fourth types of condemnation
occur at the level of specific application. The second involves the
jury's ratification of the institutional condemnation of the general
category of behavior proscribed by the offense definition, and the

third conveys the jury's condemnation of this particular instance of
the prohibited type. Although both the second and third types of
condemnation are expressed by a direct application of the
84.

Schopp, supra note 81, at 1034-35.
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institution, the second type reaffirms the institutional condemnation
of the general category, while the third type addresses the specific
criminal offense. Fourth, the conviction condemns the defendant as
one who committed the offense as an accountable agent by the
standards of the system. Fifth, it condemns that defendant as
blameworthy for wrongful behavior.
2. Hard Casesfor Moral Condemnation
In clear cases of unjustified offenses by fully culpable
offenders, such as Spike's assault on Mother Beneficence, all five
types of condemnation converge in that they clearly apply to this
defendant for this offense. Difficult cases arise when circumstances
which do not give rise to legal defenses undermine one or more of
these five types of condemnation. Juries may struggle, for example,
when they encounter a defendant who committed an unjustified and
unexcused offense under conditions of great stress or provocation
because the jurors may consider the fifth type of condemnation
inappropriate. Suppose, for example, that Smith punches Jones in
the nose in -response to a prolonged series of malicious insults by
Jones. Many jurors might think that Jones got what he deserved
and that Smith is not blameworthy for the assault, although the
provocation would not establish a legal justification or other
defense. These jurors would find the fifth type of condemnation
undeserved in such a case. Furthermore, jurors who endorse the
systemic condemnation of assault as a general category of behavior
might deny that this particular instance of that type merits
condemnation, considering the third type of condemnation
inappropriate as well.
When the official penal code diverges from the widely held
conventional morality regarding certain types of behavior, the jury
may also consider the second type of condemnation inappropriate
in that they might wish to refrain from ratifying the official
proscription of conduct of that type. Arguably, certain statutes
criminalizing fornication, cohabitation, or possession of marijuana
or obscene materials fall into this category in that they express
condemnation at the institutional level toward a type of conduct
1262
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that many jurors may not consider appropriate for moral
condemnation. If jurors who encounter circumstances such as these
accept an obligation to apply the law as they are instructed by the
judge, they may convict the defendants although they do not intend
to express condemnation of this type of conduct. In certain cases
of conscientious civil disobedience, the jurors may consider the
behavior acceptable and the defendants unusually praiseworthy.
Thus, although all five types of condemnation apply in clear cases
with fully culpable offenders such as Spike, punishment may not
accurately express condemnation of the second, third, or fifth types
under certain circumstances.8 5
In contrast to the second, third, and fifth types of
condemnation, the first type, involving condemnation at the
institutional level of the general category of conduct, inheres in any
institution of criminal punishment because the criminal justice
system represents the official conventional social morality for the
society in which it is embedded.86 Thus, it expresses
condemnation of a certain type of conduct by the standards of that
official conventional morality when it defines that type of behavior
as an offense. Many, if not all, criminal justice systems condition
conviction and punishment on retributive requirements of guilt,
culpability, responsibility, or desert.8 7 These institutions, including
the contemporary American system, establish criteria of
accountability as necessary conditions for conviction and
punishment.88 The fourth type of condemnation, involving
condemnation of the defendant as an accountable agent who has
violated the legal proscription embodied in the offense definition,

85. See generally id. (further discussing divergence).
86. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing the criminal law as representing
a conventional social morality).
87. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985)
(requiring culpable mental states for criminal liability).
88. Id. §§ 2.01,2.02,4.01; RETHmINo, supra note 3, §§ 6.6, 10.3. Note the minimal sense
of "retributive' as used here. A system is retributive in this sense if it limits criminal punishment to
those who commit offenses while meeting specified conditions of culpability that serve to render the
offense appropriately attributed to the person as a accountable agent. It does not require that the
punishment be of similar quality to the harm caused by the offense or that punishment be thought
of as restoring a moral balance. See Schopp, supra note 81, at 1020-27 (discussing this sense of
retributivism).
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inheres in punishment by these retributive systems because they
require accountability by systemic standards as a necessary
condition for conviction and punishment. Thus, condemnation of
the first and fourth types inheres in criminal punishment by a
retributive system.
In summary, the core rules of the criminal law define minimal
standards of accepted social conduct by prohibiting certain
categories of behavior and prescribing punishment for offenses. A
penal code represents an official statement of the conventional
social morality. Proscription of a category of behavior and
prescription of punishment for it expresses institutional
condemnation of that type of conduct from the perspective of that
conventional morality. The paradigmatic methods of punishment
employed by an institution assume symbolic significance in that
they come to represent systemic condemnation. Clear cases of
wrongful conduct by fully culpable actors also elicit condemnation
of four types at the level, of specific application, but only the first
(systemic) and fourth (accountability) types of condemnation inhere
in all cases of legal punishment by retributive criminal justice
systems.
3. Moral Condemnation and JustificationDefenses
Dudley, in contrast to Spike, deserves praise rather than
condemnation because he rescued the innocent Mother Beneficence
at his own risk. In order to understand the nature of justification as
a defense that renders Dudley inappropriate for conviction and
punishment, consider his case in light of the condemnation inherent
in criminal punishment and the reasons why that condemnation is
not appropriate for him. It seems immediately obvious that Dudley
does not merit the fifth type of condemnation in that he is not
morally blameworthy for his act. Many would contend that he is
praiseworthy for exposing himself to risk in order to rescue Mother
Beneficence. This fifth type of condemnation is not inherent in
criminal punishment, however, and defendants who are not
appropriate for such condemnation sometimes lack a legal defense
for their conduct. Some defendants qualify for punishment by
1264
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systemic standards despite being inappropriate for the second, third,
and fifth types.8 9
The first and fourth types of condemnation are inherent in
criminal punishment, however, rendering conviction and
punishment of defendants who do not merit these types of
condemnation unjustified. The first type addresses the general
category of behavior proscribed in an offense definition rather than
a particular act or actor. The fourth type condemns specific
defendants who violate the proscription embodied in the offense
definition in their capacities as accountable agents by systemic
standards. Dudley is a fully accountable agent who qualifies for no
recognized excuse and who fulfilled all offense elements in the
definition of assault. Dudley purposely caused bodily injury to
Spike. It initially appears, therefore, that Dudley qualifies for the
fourth type of condemnation. This appearance is deceptive,
however, because the first and fourth types of condemnation
interact in a manner that significantly affects Dudley's case. The
resolution to Dudley's case requires examination of this
relationship between the first and fourth types of condemnation.
Any particular act may constitute an instance of many different
types of action. Dudley's act of punching Spike, which exemplifies
the type of conduct proscribed by the offense definition for assault,
also constitutes an instance of the types defined as moving one's
arm, swinging one's hand, rescuing Mother Beneficence, and many
others. Dudley's act exemplifies both the type proscribed by the
offense definition for assault and the type described by the
justification defense usually referred to as 'defense-of-others.' This
defense applies to those who exercise force necessary to prevent
the unjustified use of force by another person against a third
party.' Thus, Dudley's conduct exemplifies many types of action,
only some of which are subject to the first type of condemnation
inherent in offense definitions.

89. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (explaining the relationships between
criminal punishment and the five types of condemnation).
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); DEFENsEs, supra

note 3, § 133; see supra note 82 (describing act-types and tokens).
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The objective elements of an offense definition identify the
proscribed type of action by describing certain conduct,
circumstances, or results.91 These elements specify the properties
that render an act an instance of the proscribed type. Homicide
statutes, for example, forbid acts of the type defined by the
property, "causes the death of another human being."'
Justification defenses create exceptions to the general prohibitory
norms underlying the offense definitions in that they identify
certain conditions under which conduct exemplifying these
properties remains acceptable. The defense provided for the use of
force in the defense of others, for example, provides exceptions
from the general prohibitory norm underlying the assault and
homicide statutes for acts that fulfill the offense elements for these
crimes in circumstances that render such conduct necessary to
protect another person from the use of unlawful force by a third
party.93 A fully articulated statement of the prohibitory norm
underlying an offense definition would take the form 'do not
perform acts of type T unless they are also of type J,' where 'J'
specifies the properties an act must possess in order to qualify for
an exception provided by a justification. Dudley, for example,
struck Spike in a manner that exemplifies the type of behavior
proscribed by the offense definition for assault, but his act also
constitutes an instance of the exempted category of behavior
defined by the justification provided for the defense of others.
The fourth type of condemnation condemns the actor as one
who violated a directive of the criminal law as an accountable
agent. In order to qualify for this type of condemnation, one must
meet two conditions; first, one must violate a directive of the
criminal law, and second, one must do so in one's capacity as an
accountable agent by systemic criteria. If justifications create
exceptions to the prohibitory norms represented by offense
definitions, then actors like Dudley, who qualify for justification

91.
92.
93.
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defenses, do not violate the fully articulated prohibitory norms
represented by the criminal law.
Both justifications and excuses preclude criminal punishment
because they render the fourth type of condemnation inappropriate.
This interpretation does not render justification and excuse
indistinguishable, however, because each undermines this type of
condemnation in a different manner. While justified defendants do
not violate a fully articulated prohibitory norm, excused defendants
violate such a directive, but they do not do so in their capacity as
accountable agents.94
In short, excuses exempt certain actors from condemnation and
punishment because their conduct that violates the directives of the
criminal law is not attributable to them in their capacities as
accountable agents by systemic criteria. Justifications preclude
condemnation and punishment of actors not because of the merit
of the actors but because these defenses exempt certain subsets of
generally proscribed categories of conduct from the condemnation
expressed at the institutional level by the offense definition. Thus,
justified actors do not violate fully articulated prohibitory norms.
D. Knowledge and JustificationRevisited
1. MoralCondemnation,ProhibitoryNorms, and Unknowingly
Justified Defendants
If justified defendants have not violated the fully articulated
norm, then they are immune from punishment for the same reason

which precludes punishment of those who simply fail to meet the
objective offense elements for any criminal offense. Individuals in
either category have not engaged in behavior forbidden by the
integrated set of provisions constituting the criminal law. Fletcher
correctly argues that unknowingly justified defendants do not merit

94. SCHOPP, supra note 11, § 6.5 (discussing attribution of criminal acts to accountable
agents). Agents are accountable in this sense if they possess the capacities required for accountability
in the criminal justice system. These include, for example, appropriate degrees of consciousness,
comprehension, and reasoning. Thus, an action-plan represents an actor as a decision maker, and if
the actor meets systemic standards of accountability, it represents him as an accountable agent.
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special exemptions from the general directives.95 Justification
defenses do not exempt defendants; however, they exempt
categories of behavior. Justification defenses alter the general
directives represented by the objective offense elements because
they exempt certain subsets of the generally proscribed categories
of conduct. The fully articulated directive regarding assault and
protection of others reads roughly, 'do not cause bodily injury to
another human being, unless such conduct is necessary to prevent
that other human being from using unlawful force against a third
person.' It does not read 'do not cause bodily injury to another
human being unless you are altruistically motivated.'
Compare the unknowingly justified defendant to the malicious
actor who performs legal activity for vicious reasons. Suppose the
Smith family runs a small laundry business that barely makes
enough profit to maintain the family. Jones owns a highly
profitable chain of commercial laundries which have made him
wealthy. Jones opens another store across the street from the Smith
laundry purely for the satisfaction of driving them out of business.
Jones successfully does so through the legal business advantages
derived from greater volume and capital. Jones, like the
unknowingly justified defendant, acts from pure malice, but he is
immune from conviction and punishment and from the type of
condemnation inherent in legal punishment because he has not
performed any act prohibited by a fully articulated prohibitory
norm.
Some might suggest that Jones differs from unknowingly
justified defendants in that he has not violated any general
prohibitory norm represented by an offense definition. One who
violates a general prohibitory norm, these critics would contend,
does not deserve the advantage afforded by the exception unless he
acts while aware of it.96 To say that a certain class of acts are
excepted from a prohibitory norm, however, is just to say that these
acts are not prohibited. If justifications create exceptions to general
prohibitions, then acts which fall into these categories, like the evil

95.
96.

1268

See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcher's argument of medt).
This is essentially Fletcher's argument of merit. See i

1993 / JustificationDefenses And Just Convictions
but legal acts of Jones, are not legally prohibited. One cannot
consistently say that justification defenses create exceptions to
general prohibitory norms and that conduct falling within the scope
of the justifications violates those norms. Thus, a person whose
conduct falls within the scope of a justification, like a person who
performs no conduct violating an offense definition, conforms to
the fully articulated prohibitory norm.
Suppose, however, that one were to defime justification defenses
in a manner that included the knowledge requirement in the
description of the exceptions to the general prohibition. Fletcher
contends that justifications have objective and subjective elements.
Justification defenses exculpate, on this view, because the
defendant had good and sufficient reasons for violating the general
prohibitory norm.97 Fletcher describes the prohibitory norm
generated by integrating the general prohibition against homicide
with the self-defense justification as, "[t]hou shalt not kill unless
thine own life or limb is in great danger."98 Consider the
alternative formulation, 'thou shalt not kill unless you know that
thine own life or limb is in danger.'
2. JustificationDefenses with Subjective Elements
If one defines justifications purely in terms of objective
circumstances and, further, contends that justifications create
exceptions to prohibitory norms and that these justifications are
available only to defendants who are aware of those justificatory
circumstances, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why
the general prohibition applies to some acts that are explicitly
excepted from it. By drafting the defense in a manner that includes
both objective circumstances and the knowledge requirement in the
description of the exempted subclass, however, one avoids this
predicament because acts fall into the excepted subclass only if the
defendant knows of the justificatory circumstances.

97.
98.

REINKING, supra note 3, at 576.
Id. at 457.
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A thorough evaluation of this proposal requires further
elaboration of the role of the fourth type of condemnation in light
of the prospective and retrospective functions of criminal offense
definitions. These provisions operate prospectively by providing
directives to citizens. These directives impose obligations of
compliance on citizens and describe the types of conduct
individuals must avoid in order to fulfill those obligations."'
Although the criminal law enforces these directives through the
threat and application of criminal punishment, they probably serve
primarily as guidelines for voluntary compliance and only
secondarily as retrospective criteria for coercive intervention by the
criminal justice system."°
When courts apply these directives retrospectively as criteria for
criminal conviction and punishment, they must determine whether
the defendants performed prohibited acts for which they may fairly
be held accountable. Fletcher contends that prohibitory norms and
justifications that create exceptions to these norms serve the
prospective function, while excuses address only the retrospective
function by exculpating those defendants whose conduct cannot
fairly be attributed to them as accountable agents." 1
Fletcher frames prohibitory norms as directives prohibiting
conduct such as killing or stealing. 2 These directives address
objective offense elements without culpability elements."' They
prohibit certain categories of acts defined by properties specified
as conduct, circumstances, or results. Thus, they direct citizens to
refrain from performing any specific acts of the type defined by the
objective offense elements in the definition of the criminal offense.
Individuals who use these norms as guidelines for voluntary
compliance must evaluate contemplated behavior in order to
determine whether it would constitute an instance of a prohibited
type. People act in furtherance of their goals or desires by pursuing

99. Id. at 456-57.
100. Schopp, supra note 81, at 1011-13.
101. REzriNGo, supra note 3, at 456-57, 491-92. Presumably the norms and justifications
serve both functions because they provide courts with criteria of exculpation when they apply.
102. Id. at 456.
103. See, e.g., supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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action-plans which consist of a set of acts intended to achieve some
end. Stated intuitively, they pursue an action-plan in order to
achieve some end."04
Dudley, for example, punches Spike and restrains him in order
to protect Mother Beneficence and facilitate Spike's arrest.
Dudley's action-plan consists of the set of acts he selects to
achieve his purpose and the decision to engage in that set of acts.
The set includes acts that are intended or anticipated as part of the
action-plan. Dudley's intended acts include punching Spike, holding
Spike on the ground, and yelling "call the police" to a bystander.
If Dudley anticipated that yelling to the bystander would startle the
bystander but did not yell for the purpose of startling that person,
then startling the bystander was an anticipated but not intended
component of the action-plan. Acts described as intended and
anticipated in the terminology of action-theory correspond10 5roughly
to acts performed purposely and knowingly in the MPC.
Had Dudley wanted only to rescue Mother Beneficence and not
to facilitate Spike's arrest, he might have chosen to yell at Spike
rather than punching him on the expectation that doing so would
frighten Spike, causing him to run away. In most circumstances,
actors select action-plans to act upon from a wide array of potential
action-plans because they believe that the intended and anticipated
acts that comprise the plan selected are more likely than those in
any available alternative plan to satisfy their complex set of wants
06
and goals.1
Offense definitions serve the prospective function of the
criminal law by altering the desirability of prospective action-plans.
The objective offense elements proscribe certain act-types such as
causing the death or bodily injury of another human being. 07 The

104. SCHOPP, supra note II,at 92-93.
105. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.2, 4.3 (discussing the significance of acts and action-plans for
criminal responsibility). The discussion omits the distinction between action-plans and projected
act-trees for the sake of brevity. Interested readers can refer to id. §§ 4.2, 4.3. Reckless and knowing
acts are both anticipated components of the action-plan.
106. Id. The claim is only that people generally seek action-plans that satisfy their wants and
goals and not that they systematically review all possibilities for each decision.
107. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1-210.4 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985)
(homicide); i&L§ 211.1 (assault).
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moral condemnation inherent in the proscription and the prospect
of punishment for performing acts of the proscribed types reduce
the probability that actors will select action-plans that include
instances of these types as intended or anticipated components.
Although actors select action-plans on the basis of the intended and
anticipated acts that constitute these plans, the actual results may
differ from those intended or anticipated due to error or luck.
In their prospective role as directives regarding future behavior,
offense elements address action-plan selection rather than actual
conduct. The conduct actually performed by a particular individual
is the product of action-plan selection, predictive accuracy, and
luck, but information regarding predictive errors and luck is not
available to the deliberating agent during the process of action-plan
selection."°8 Thus, the directives represented by objective offense
elements are most accurately understood as instructions regarding
action-plan selection. As applied to the prospective function,
homicide statutes express the directive, 'do not act on action-plans
that include intended or anticipated acts that cause the death of
another human being.'1 9
Action-plans rather than acts most accurately represent actors
as decision making agents because action-plans represent the wants,
intentions, and expectations of the actors, while actual acts diverge
from action-plans due to error or luck.110 Culpability elements
define a required relation between the conduct forbidden by the
objective offense elements and the decision maker as represented
by the action-plan. A purposeful culpability element applies to an
act directly representing the actor's wants and intentions, while a
negligent culpability element represents a less direct relationship
between the decision maker's action-plan and the proscribed

108.

Information about general accuracy or the probability of errors in these circumstances may

be available, but not information regarding the actual errors or luck that will affect the outcome of
this decision.
109. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2, 210.3 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985)
(purposeful, knowing, or reckless homicide); SCHOPp, supra note 11, § 4.2 (discussing the
relationship between purposeful, knowing, or reckless homicide and intended or anticipated acts on
action-plans).
110. ScHoP, supra note 11, at 99-100.
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conduct.111 Thus, an actor who causes the death of another person
by acting on an action-plan that includes killing that person as an
intended action commits murder, while one who causes the death
of another by acting on an action-plan that would have included
killing the other person as an anticipated act if the actor had
deliberated with due care commits negligent homicide. 2
Failure of proof defenses regarding the culpability element
exculpate the defendant by demonstrating that the act which
exemplifies the proscribed type lacked the relation to the
action-plan required by the offense definition and, thus, that this
offense cannot be attributed to the actor as an accountable
agent." 3 By undermining the required relation between the actor
as an accountable agent and the proscribed conduct, these defenses
undermine the fourth type of condemnation discussed previously
which condemns the actor as one who violates the criminal law in
his capacity as an accountable agent by systemic standards." 4
Excuses undermine the fourth type of condemnation by
undermining the actor's status as an accountable agent, at least as
applied to this offense. The insanity defense, for example,
exculpates those who fulfill all offense elements while suffering
severe psychological dysfunction which renders them incapable of
functioning as accountable agents regarding this conduct." 5 In
short, excuses and failure of proof defenses regarding the
culpability elements preclude the fourth type of condemnation by
defeating the attribution of this offense to this person as an
accountable agent. For this reason, both categories of defenses are

111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.2 (describing the significance of action-plans for the culpability
elements).
112. SCHOP? at 95-102; MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, 210.4 (Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1985) (murder and negligent homicide). One who acts on an action-plan including the
homicide as an intended action performs that action purposefully, fulfilling the requirements of the
murder statute. One who acts on an action-plan that would have included the homicide as an
anticipated act if the actor had exercised due care in selecting the action-plan causes the death
through lack of due care; that is, negligently.
113. ScHoPP, supra note 11, at 106-07; DEFENSES, supra note 3, §§ 22,62(b) (failure-of-proof
defenses).
114. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (describing five types of condemnation
expressed by criminal punishment of clearly culpable offenders).
115. SCHOPP, supra note 11, ch. 6.
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primarily relevant to courts engaged in the retrospective function
of the law.
Justifications, in contrast, address both the prospective and
retrospective functions. Justifications serve the retrospective
function in that they exempt a subset of acts from the general
prohibition expressed by the offense definition, identifying
circumstances in which the court should exculpate defendants who
fulfill all offense elements." 6 These defendants do not qualify for
the fourth type of condemnation because they have not violated the
fully articulated prohibitory norms as formulated by integrating the
offense definitions with the justification defenses stated purely as
conduct, circumstances, and results.1 1 7 Unknowingly justified
defendants would violate the fully articulated norms if the
exceptions created by justification defenses contained both
objective elements and a knowledge requirement. These defendants
would not qualify for the exceptions provided by justification
defenses drafted in this manner because they did not violate the
general norm for good and sufficient reasons."'
Although unknowingly justified defendants did not violate the
general norm for good and sufficient reasons, such reasons were
available. That is, circumstances provided good and sufficient
reasons for violating the norm, but these defendants did not act for
those reasons. In these cases, the available reasons justified the acts
that exemplified the proscribed act-types, but the actor's action-plan
did not reflect or rely upon these reasons. If, for example, Dudley
failed to notice that Spike was attacking Mother Beneficence and
attacked Spike only for the purpose of stealing Spike's wallet, then
Dudley's conduct would have exemplified the act-type described as
rescuing another person from an unlawful use of force, but his
action-plan would not reflect that act-type as intended or
anticipated. His action-plan would consist of the plan to punch
Spike in order to rob him.

116. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing justification defenses as
modifying prohibitory norms).
117. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (describing fully articulated norms).
118. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing justification defenses as
including objective and subjective elements).
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A justification defense with a knowledge requirement would
direct the defense toward the defendant's action-plan by limiting its
scope to those who acted on an action-plan that included acts
representing the justificatory reasons as anticipated or intended
components. The action-plan represents the actor as a decision
maker, however, providing the foundation for attributions of
accountability, culpability, and blameworthiness. 19 The
action-plan and the manner in which it is selected are critical to
excuses and failure-of-proof defenses because these defenses
address the attribution of the offense to the actor as an accountable
agent by systemic standards of accountability. Thus, a penal code
that drafts justification defenses with knowledge requirements
conflates the role of justifications with those of excuses and failureof-proof defenses by directing the justification defenses toward the
action-plan and the attribution of the offense to the actor as an
accountable agent rather than toward modifications of general
prohibitory norms.
In adjudicating a claim of justification under a justificatory
provision including a knowledge requirement, a court would have
to ask two questions: First, was X's act A justified? and second,
was X justified in performing A? The first question addresses the
reasons available in the situation for performing A in order to
appraise the social acceptability of the act from the external point
of view. The second question addresses the reasons that X was
aware of in order to appraise X's decision to engage in the conduct
from the internal point of view.12° A successful claim of
justification under this type of provision would require both
external and internal justification.
Although intuitively clear cases of fully justified actors such as
Dudley perform actions which are justified from both the internal
and external points of view, justification defenses should not
require internal justification based on justificatory knowledge for

119.

See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text (discussing the action plan as representing

the decision maker's wants and intentions).
120. The author uses the terms -external" and -internal" partially to avoid widespread
ambiguity regarding the meaning of "subjective" and "objective! in the discussion of justification
defenses.
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at least three reasons regarding the retrospective function. First, as
explained above, doing so conflates the role of justifications with
those of other defenses by directing the inquiry toward the actor's
action-plan and the attribution of conduct to the actor as an
accountable agent. Second, although internal justification is relevant
to the fifth type of condemnation which addresses the moral
blameworthiness of the fully culpable actor for performing the
offense, this type of condemnation is not inherent in legal
conviction and punishment.12 1 Internal justification would
constitute one aspect of a comprehensive moral evaluation, but
blameworthiness from this perspective is neither necessary nor
sufficient for accountability by the systemic standards of the
conventional morality represented by the criminal law. 2 Third,
the knowledge requirement serves primarily to extend liability to
some defendants who would otherwise avoid criminal punishment
only through luck, but attempt liability applies to these
individuals. 123 Fletcher correctly argues that unknowingly
124
justified defendants do not merit exemption from liability.
Attempt liability provides liability within the conventional morality
embodied in the criminal law, however, and moral merit involves
the fifth type of condemnation already discussed rather than the
first and fourth types which are inherent in criminal punishment.
While these considerations render the knowledge requirement
inappropriate for the retrospective function, it is simply unnecessary
and redundant for the prospective function. Justification defenses
and the general prohibitions they modify serve the prospective
function of the criminal law by providing norms for voluntary

121. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text and infra notes 214-24 and accompanying
text (discussing the significance of condemnation as morally blameworthy for criminal conviction and
punishment).
122. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing the types of condemnation
inherent in criminal punishment).
123. DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 122(d). The MPC formulation of attempt liability applies to
these cases in that they involve defendants who engaged in conduct that would have constituted an
offense if circumstances had been as the defendants believed them to be. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01
(Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). The precise scope of attempt liability varies across
jurisdictions. For a discussion of various approaches to attempt liability, see W. LAFAvE & A. ScorT,
JR., CRiwmiAL LAw §§ 6.2, 6.3 (2d ed. 1986).
124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing Fletcher's argument of merit).
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compliance. Individuals who rely on these guidelines in directing
their conduct select action-plans intended to avoid behavior that
violates the fully articulated norms. The fully articulated norm
regarding homicide with the self-defense exception as formulated
without the knowledge requirement directs the individual to refrain
from acting on action-plans that include acts which cause the death
of another human being unless those acts qualify as
self-defense. "
A knowledge requirement in a justification defense is redundant
for the prospective function because all acts in an action-plan are
anticipated or intended, rendering it impossible for an actor to act
prospectively on an action-plan including an act of self-defense
without realizing that it is an act of self-defense. That is, any
prospective act of self-defense in an action-plan must be anticipated
or intended as an act of self-defense in order to be part of the
action-plan as an act of self-defense. Thus, adding a knowledge
requirement adds nothing to the norm as applied to the prospective
function because the norm directs actors regarding action-plans
which include only acts defined by properties the actors are aware
of whether or not the knowledge requirement is included. Simply
stated, the knowledge requirement is redundant for the prospective
function because the process of action-plan selection addresses only
126
anticipated and intended acts.
In summary, excuses, failure-of-proof defenses, and justification
defenses undermine the grounds for the moral condemnation
inherent in criminal punishment. Justifications preclude this
condemnation in a different manner than the other defenses.
Excuses and failure-of-proof defenses render this condemnation
inappropriate by defeating attribution of the offenses to the
defendants as accountable agents, while justifications preclude this

125. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (discussing justification defenses as altering
the fully articulated prohibitory norm).
126. That the action-plan includes only anticipated and intended acts while the knowledge
requirement addresses knowledge rather than anticipation does not establish a significant difference
between the two. Prospectively, both approaches require awareness that the act is highly likely to be
generated; retrospectively, both require that the actor expected that the act which was actually
generated would be generated. SCHOPP, supra note 11, § 4.2.
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condemnation by exempting the actor's conduct from the general
proscription. If the justificatory provisions creating those exceptions
are drafted purely in terms of conduct, circumstances, and results,
then limiting the defense to knowingly justified actors permits
condemnation ostensibly for accountable violations of the norms
directed toward actors who have not violated the fully articulate
norms.127 Alternately, justifications drafted with a knowledge
requirement avoid this problem, but the requirement is redundant
for the prospective function of the norms and it needlessly
conflates justifications with other defenses when applied
retrospectively. 28
The approach to the controversy regarding unknowingly
justified defendants advanced here relies upon a theoretical
framework emphasizing the moral condemnation inherent in legal
punishment, the distinction between external and internal
justification, and an interpretation of criminal offenses grounded in
action-theory. In order to support these organizing principles for the
analysis of justification defenses, the next section will apply these
principles to the previously identified difficult cases regarding
unknowingly justified actors and putative justification. The
following sections will apply these principles to the remaining
controversial issues and difficult cases, contending that this form
of analysis clarifies the parameters of legal justification defenses.
3. Hard Cases and the Knowledge Requirement
First, consider the difficult cases involving unknowingly

justified or putatively justified defendants such as Ann, Anna, and
Alice. These cases elicit troubling intuitions because the actors are
neither unambiguously guilty like Spike nor fully justified like
129
Dudley. Recall that Ann, Anna, and Alice attack other persons.

127. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing justifications and fully
articulated norms).
128. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing justification provisions with
explicit subjective elements).
129. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (describing Ann and Anna); supra notes
74-75 and accompanying text (describing Alice).
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Ann is unknowingly justified, while Anna acts from the mistaken
belief that she is justified. Alice realizes that circumstances justify
her attack, but she acts out of hate. Arguably, common intuitions
would hold Anna but not Ann or Alice justified.
The type of condemnation inherent in punishment and the
distinction between internal and external justification are central to
understanding these cases. Although it seems intuitively wrong to
say that Ann and Alice were justified in acting as they did, their
acts were externally justified in the circumstances. Both Ann and
Alice were morally blameworthy for acting on malicious motive,
but this addresses the fifth type of condemnation involving moral
blameworthiness which is not inherent in criminal punishment.
Neither is eligible for the critical fourth type of condemnation
because neither violated a fully articulated norm. The justificatory
circumstances provided external justification for their actions,
bringing that behavior within the scope of an exception to the
general prohibitory norm created by a justification defense.
Alice, but not Ann, was internally justified in the sense that she
was aware of the justificatory circumstances that exempted her
conduct from the general norm. Thus, Ann would be vulnerable to
attempt liability, but Alice would not because attempt liability
attaches to those whose conduct would constitute crimes if the
circumstances were as the actors believed them to be.13° Ann's
attempt liability constitutes the legal system's devise for holding
her liable for acting in an internally unjustified manner in
circumstances which fortuitously render her action externally
justified. Such attempt liability increases convergence between legal
liability and common moral intuitions. Alice, like the malevolent
launderer Jones, would be morally blameworthy but not subject to
condemnation for any offense contained in the conventional
morality embodied in the criminal law."' Not surprisingly,
common intuitions are more likely to reflect the popular

130.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (defining

attempt liability).

131.

See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (describing Alice).
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conventional morality than the official version institutionalized in
the criminal law when the popular morality and the law diverge.
Anna, contrary to some people's intuition, lacks legal
justification because she violated a fully articulated prohibitory
norm. The intuitive notion that Anna was justified by her
reasonable but mistaken belief that justificatory conditions applied
reflects a judgment of internal justification which addresses both
her lack of moral blameworthiness and the attribution of the
violation to her in her capacity as an accountable agent by systemic
standards. Her lack of moral blameworthiness is relevant to the
fifth type of condemnation of an offender as morally blameworthy
which is not inherent in criminal punishment. Hence the fact that
she does not qualify for that type of condemnation does not in
itself preclude conviction and punishment. Her reasonable mistake
regarding justification is relevant to the fourth type of
condemnation, however, in that it undermines the attribution of her
prohibited act to her in her capacity as an accountable agent. That
is, the circumstances that led to her reasonable but erroneous belief
that she was justified prevented her from selecting her action-plan
in light of the relevant information.132 Thus, her action-plan did
not include an unjustified offense, as defined by the fully
articulated norm, as an anticipated or intended component of the
plan. Factors that undermine the fourth type of condemnation by
virtue of defects in the action-plan, the process of action-plan
selection, or the required relation between action-plan and
proscribed conduct exculpate the actor, but they do not justify the
action. Putative justification provides internal but not external
justification, supporting excuse but not a justification defense.
This analysis also accommodates Greenawalt's case involving
the forest ranger who bums a section of forest because he

132.

In this Article, the author discusses only reasonable mistakes regarding justification. Those

who commit unjustified offenses due to reasonably mistaken beliefs are blameworthy for neither the
proscribed conduct nor the mistake. Reckless or negligent mistakes regarding justification raise more
complex issues with respect to blameworthiness for the mistake and for offenses with recklessness
or negligence as culpability elements. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2) (Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1985); DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 184 (discussing mistakes regarding justification with
various degrees of culpability).
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reasonably but erroneously believes that doing so in necessary to
save the town.133 Greenawalt contends that one ought to be
justified in making the best choice in light of all available
information.3 4 Indeed, we might suppose the ranger places
himself at some danger in carrying out his decision. The ranger is
justified in burning the forest, and he is praiseworthy for accepting

personal risk in order to carry out his plan. While he is justified in
burning the forest, however, burning the forest is not justified. That
is, the ranger is internally justified by the reasons he has access to,
but the act of burning the forest is not externally justified by all the
reasons there are. Some causal factor, such as changing wind
conditions, rendered his action unnecessary to save the town and,
hence, unjustified. He was internally justified in acting, however,
because he was not aware of this factor at the time he was
confronted with the decision. In this way, the ranger resembles
Anna who was also confronted with a decision in the absence of
full information.
The ranger may elicit even stronger intuitive approval than
Anna because the story clearly indicates that the ranger is morally
praiseworthy for fulfilling what he reasonably understood to be his
responsibility at some risk to himself. His moral praiseworthiness
renders inappropriate the fifth type of condemnation, however, and
this is not the type that inheres in legal punishment. Once one
recognizes the distinctions between internal and external
justification and between moral blameworthiness and systemic legal
accountability, one can describe the ranger as systemically
accountable because he possesses 'the required capacities and as
internally justified and praiseworthy for performing acts which are
not externally justified. Although the ranger is an accountable agent
by systemic standards, his externally unjustified act is not
appropriately attributed to him in this status because his reasonable
error resulted in his selecting an action-plan on which the intended
acts were justified. These conditions preclude the fourth type of
condemnation in a manner that grounds excuse rather than

133.

See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing case 3.2, the forest ranger).

134.

Id.
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justification. Thus, the ranger is excused from legal liability, and
he is morally praiseworthy for his conscientious decision and effort.
The final difficult case regarding the knowledge requirement
involves X and Y who attack one another out of mutual mistakes,
generating a conflict between two putatively justified actors.135
Each actor is internally but not externally justified. Interpreted in
this manner, these cases create no problem of conflicting
justifications because each lacks the external justification that
supports a justification defense, although each may be eligible for
excuse. 136
E. The Social Matrix and the Incompatibility Thesis
1. Assisting JustifiedActs
Fletcher contends that justifications modify prohibitory norms,
creating a complex matrix giving rise to a complex set of related
social responsibilities. Third parties may assist justified acts, and
they may not resist or interfere with these acts." 7 This claim
seems intuitively plausible in that justified acts are legally
permissible acts, and there is no obvious reason why one may not

assist another in performing a legal act or why one may interfere
with a legal act. Dudley illustrates the positive aspect of this matrix
in that he justifiably assists Mother Beneficence in her justified
exercise of self-defense. Any third party who interfered with
Mother Beneficence and Dudley by entering the fray in support of
Spike would have violated the negative aspect which proscribes
interference with justified conduct such as that of Mother
Beneficence and Dudley.

135.

See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing case 3.3, mutually justified

violent confrontation).
136. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (differentiating justification and excuse).
137. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (describing the social matrix and related
rights and responsibilities).

1282

1993 / Justification Defenses And Just Convictions

The incompatibility thesis holds that two parties in violent
conflict with one another cannot both be justified.13 The
incompatibility thesis can be understood as a corollary of the
negative aspect of the social matrix. Two parties in violent conflict
each interfere with the other; if either is justified, then the other
interferes with justified conduct and cannot be justified according
to the social matrix. Therefore, no more than one party in the
conflict can be justified.
This thesis apparently works well when applied to Spike's
attack and the resulting conflict. Mother Beneficence is justified but
Spike is not. Dudley assists Mother Beneficence by interfering with
Spike, creating a second conflict in which Dudley is justified but
Spike is not. Should some third party misunderstand the situation
and intervene to protect Spike from Dudley, that person could not
be justified because she would interfere with Dudley who is
justified. She may, however, qualify for an excuse if she reasonably
misinterpreted the situation.139
When combined with the requirement that the justified
defendant act with justificatory knowledge, the social matrix
encounters difficulty with cases in which Z knowingly assists the
unknowingly justified X in killing Y. If X lacks justification
because he lacks justificatory knowledge, then it seems that Z is
both justified and unjustified. Z is justified in that she acts with
knowledge of the justificatory circumstances, and she is unjustified
in that she assists in X's unjustified killing of y. 140 The
distinction between internal and external justification allows one to
resolve this type of problem regarding the social matrix. X's killing
of Y is externally justified by all of the relevant reasons that
actually apply, although X is not internally justified by the reasons

138. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. Some conflicts can involve additional
parties who participate as principals in more complex conflicts or as assistants to the primary parties;
however, I will use this simple formulation. In addition, the thesis must be understood as limited to
illegal conflicts, with legal contests such as boxing matches or football games falling beyond the
scope of the claim.
139. See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (discussing putative justification as an
excuse).

140.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing case 4.1, where Z is apparently both

justified and unjustified).
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of which he is aware. Although the act that X actually performs is
a member of an exempted subset of behavior generally proscribed
by the prohibitory norm, he acts on an action-plan which includes
an act of the proscribed type as an intended act. X's action-plan
renders him morally blameworthy because the plan represents X as
an accountable agent.141 The criminal law distributes punishment
for committing proscribed conduct as an accountable agent,
however, not for being a person who acts on reprehensible motives.
In this matter, X resembles the malevolent launderer Jones who
engaged in reprehensible but legal conduct for malicious
motives.142 X remains vulnerable to attempt liability which
applies to those who act on action-plans intended to produce
proscribed conduct. Attempt liability expresses the systemic
condemnation of such action-plans and of those who act on
them. 143
Z is both internally and externally justified. Her action-plan
exemplified the exempted subtype that X actually performed
(justifiably killing) rather than the proscribed type of conduct
(unjustified killing) that X intended. The apparent contradiction
regarding Z's action is illusory because she is internally justified
by the reasons she is aware of and she is externally justified by all
relevant reasons. She assisted X in the externally justified act he
actually performed rather than in the internally unjustified act he
intended.
This resolution of Z's case demonstrates why third parties may
justifiably assist justified acts. This third party permission arises
from the external justification of the act, and not from the original
actor's internal justification in performing the act. The third party
who assists another in performing a justified act stands in a
position analogous to an accomplice to a legally permissible

141. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text (discussing action-plans as representing
actors as agents).
142. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (describing Jones).
143. See supra notes 29, 123 and accompanying text (discussing attempt liability and putative
justification).
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act. 144 That is, the third party behaves as an accomplice to an act
which exemplifies an exempted sub-type of the generally

proscribed behavior and which, therefore, does not violate the
prohibitory norm. These third parties do not qualify for the fourth

type of condemnation because they have neither committed nor
assisted legally proscribed conduct. Their intentions and motives
determine
whether they qualify for attempt liability or moral
145
blame.
2. The Duty Not to Interfere and the Incompatibility Thesis
In addition to the right to assist justified acts, the complete
social matrix includes the duty not to resist or interfere with
justified acts and the associated incompatibility thesis. 146 Critics
attack the duty not to resist or interfere and the incompatibility
thesis by advancing difficult cases which constitute putative
counter-examples to the duty and to the thesis in that two or more
parties are arguably justified'in interfering with one another in a
violent confrontation.147 If one accepts both parties' action as
justified, these cases defeat the duty not to resist justified action
because each party is justified in acting in a manner that interferes
with the other's justified action, and they defeat the incompatibility
thesis because both parties to a violent confrontation are justified.
In one case, the defendant Young came to the aid of an
apparent mugging victim who was actually struggling with two
police officers attempting to complete a lawful arrest. One of the
police officers was injured in the ensuing struggle, and Young was
convicted of criminal assault.1 4 Greenawalt advances this case as
one involving a violent conflict among justified actors. The police
were justified in making a lawful arrest and in resisting Young's

144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)-(3) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (providing
for accomplice liability).
145. See supra notes 29, 123 and accompanying text (discussing attempt liability).
146. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (describing this duty and the incompatibility
thesis in Fletcher's theory).
147. See supranotes 39-44 and accompanying text (describing these putative cases of justified
interference or mutually justified violent conflict).
148. People v. Young, 183 N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1961), revg 210 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1962).
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interference with that arrest. Yet, Young was justified in
intervening in what he reasonably believed to be a mugging
because, surely, society wants to encourage rather than condemn
the willingness of citizens to protect one another from
mugging.

149

Young was not justified in interfering with a lawful arrest, and
this is the type of action that his conduct actually exemplified. Yet,
Young acted on an action-plan which included as an intended act
an act of rescuing a mugging victim but not an act of interfering
with an arrest. Young's conduct exemplified the act-type proscribed
by the offense definition for criminal assault, but the intended act
on his action-plan exemplified the exempted sub-type represented

by the justification for defense of others. The intuitive judgment
that Young does not deserve condemnation for acting as he did
reflects his action-plan which represents him as an accountable
agent, providing the appropriate focus for attributions of desert.
Thus, Young was internally justified in acting on his action-plan,
although his act that actually resulted was not externally justified.
Young was not culpable for his unjustified act, either by the
standards of ordinary critical morality or by the standards of the
conventional morality represented by the criminal law.150 He is
not a proper subject of the fourth type of condemnation inherent in
criminal punishment because his reasonable mistake regarding
justification prevents attribution of his externally unjustified offense
to him as an accountable agent. This reason for withholding
condemnation supports the excuse of putative justification based on
mistake rather than justification, however, thus rendering the
apparent conflict between mutually justified actors illusory. The
police officers were both internally and externally justified in
pursuing the lawful arrest and in resisting Young's interference in
that arrest. The police officers and Young were internally justified,
but only the officers were externally justified. Thus, the case

149. Perplexing Borders, supra note 14, at 1919-20. This case also provides an example of the
same type as the difficult case listed as 3.3 in the summary list of § II.
150. JoEL FELNBERO, HARMLESS WRONODOINO 124-26 (1988) (distinguishing critical morality
as correct or rationally defensible morality and conventional morality as the set of rules and principles
actually established and accepted in a society).
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represents a conflict between the justified use of force and
excusable force. This case demonstrates that it distorts the social
matrix attributed to justification defenses to say that only one party
to a violent conflict can be justified. More than one party to the
conflict can be internally justified, but this social matrix precludes
the possibility of conflicting externally justified acts.
Certain prison escape cases also present difficult challenges to
the social matrix and to the incompatibility thesis. Courts and
commentators disagree regarding the application of justification
defenses to prison inmates who escape from incarceration in order
to avoid impending violence."' If one contends that these
defendants are justified under the general justification available to
those who choose the lesser evil, these cases seem to violate the
incompatibility thesis in that prison officers who attempt to prevent
these escapes act in pursuit of their legal responsibilities and within
the scope of the justificatory defense available to those who use
force in law enforcement. 52 This interpretation arguably justifies
both sides of a violent conflict.
This apparent conflict between two justified parties only arises
in certain limited conditions. If the prisoner can avoid the violence
that constitutes the greater evil by fleeing from a cell or common
area to the custody of the officials, the conflict does not arise.
Under those circumstances, only flight to the officials is justified
by the defense, and the officials' fulfill their duty by accepting
custody of the prisoner. The difficult conflicts arise when the
prisoner can avoid the violence only by escaping from the custody
of officials.
One might argue that the officials should be excused rather than
justified in their use of force. According to this line of argument,
the prisoner's justified escape constitutes legal activity under an
exception to the norm proscribing escape. The officials who

151. See, e.g., D. Dolinko, Comment, Intolerable Conditionsas a Defense to Prison Escapes,
26 UCLA L. REv. 1126 (1979); Prison Conditions,supra note 14 (exemplifying this debate).
152.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (choice of evils);

k § 3.07(1), (3) (justified force in law enforcement). The MPC includes "believes- language, but
in light of the previous discussion of putative justification, the author treats these provisions as
requiring actual necessity.
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exercise force in resisting this escape do so under the reasonable
but mistaken belief that the escape is unlawful, and thus, they fall
under the excuse provided for putative justification. This
interpretation may strike many readers as inadequate for two
reasons. First, it apparently licenses escalating violence by the
justified escapees as they exert the force necessary to accomplish
their justified ends and to protect themselves from the excused but
unjustified force directed at them by the officials. Second, it seems

inadequate to say that the officials engage in wrongful but
excusable conduct when they act in pursuit of the responsibility
with which the legal system charges them.
Alternately, one might argue that the escapees should be
excused rather than justified.'53 This interpretation also
encounters difficulties, however, because the justificatory choice of
evils defense appears to most clearly apply to at least some of
these cases in that the escapees commit relatively less serious
escape offenses in order to prevent more serious murders or sexual
assaults. 154 Such escapes to avoid murder or sexual assault seem
to merit exculpation, even if the escapees act without the disability
or extreme fear that would ordinarily ground excuse. In short, it is
difficult to explain why defendants should be excused rather than
justified in circumstances in which they lack the disability that
usually grounds excuse and in which the specific defense that most
accurately applies is the justificatory defense for choice of the
lesser evil rather than an excuse. 155
Finally, one might deny the incompatibility thesis, contending
that both parties are justified, but this position legitimizes mutual
violence, apparently violating the matrix which purports to establish
a set of compatible rights and duties.1 56 Although this
interpretation frustrates the criminal law's function of preventing

153.

Prison Conditions, supra note 14.

154. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.6(4) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985)
(escape as a third degree felony) with id § 210.2(2) (murder as a first degree felony) and id. §
213.2(1) (forced deviate sexual intercourse as a second degree felony).
155. Some commentators would argue that duress is the most appropriate defense and that
coercion provides the disability. See infra notes 182-244 and accompanying text (discussing duress).
156. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (describing the social matrix).
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violent confrontation, however, the criminal law pursues a complex
set of purposes, and there is no reason to assume that any possible
interpretation can completely satisfy all of them. The criminal law
is intended to prevent crime and to limit punishment to culpable
offenders, for example, and certain defenses and procedural devises
designed to promote the latter goal may frustrate the former.157
Furthermore, the potential for mutually justified violence in prison
escape cases interpreted in this manner does not arise from a defect
internal to the theoretical formulation of justification defenses.

Rather, it reflects a tension between these defenses and the
provisions that license arrest and detention.
The social matrix and the incompatibility thesis appropriately
apply to justification defenses defined in terms of actual necessity,
with reasonable but mistaken belief regarding necessity giving rise
to excuse for putative justification.158 Statutes authorizing the use
of force by officers in arrest, detention, or escape prevention
ordinarily apply to any lawful arrest or detention." 9 Lawful arrest
by a law enforcement officer ordinarily requires reasonable grounds
to believe that the subject has committed a crime. 16' Thus,
authorization to use force in law enforcement requires only belief
regarding the relevant conditions even if justification defenses
require actual necessity. These provisions collapse external
justification into internal justification by authorizing arrest on the
basis of reasonable belief. That is, they create an exception to the
general prohibitory norm against the use of force, but they do so
on the basis of the officer's reasonable beliefs regarding the
grounds for arrest. By virtue of these provisions, arresting officers
qualify for exceptions to the general prohibitory norms on the basis
of internal rather than external justification. Potential cases of
mutual justified violence during prison escapes reflect this contrast
157. One might plausibly argue, for example, that the insanity defense limits punishment to
culpable offenders at the expense of creating a loophole through which some guilty defendants escape
punishment and continue to commit crimes. Similarly, one might contend that restrictions on
searches, seizures, and confessions limit the state's ability to secure convictions and prevent crime.
158. See supra notes 95-136 and accompanying text (discussing justification and putative
justification).
159. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(1), (3) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
160. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 123, § 5.10(a).
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between justification defenses grounded in necessity and arrest
authorized by the arresting officers' reasonable beliefs.
These conflicts between externally justified justification
defenses and internally justified exercises, of force in law
enforcement are not unique to prison escape cases. Suppose, for
example, that X sees terrorist Y bringing a bomb into a crowded
building in a baby carriage. X knocks Y down, and rushes from the
building with the carriage in order to prevent harm to the other
occupants when the bomb detonates. Police officer Z witnesses X's
conduct and attempts to stop and arrest X in the building. X is
justified in her assault on Y and in taking Y's property from the
building by the justificatory defenses addressing defense of others
and choice of evils, but Z is also authorized in exercising force
against X in making an arrest based on reasonable belief. This
conflict between legal acts reflects the potential tension between
externally justified justification defenses and internally justified
arrest.
These cases suggest that justification defenses create a matrix
of social responsibility, but the claim that others may assist
justified acts and may not interfere with such acts misstates the
parameters of the matrix. Consider the clear case of force
justifiably exercised by Dudley against Spike. Suppose that as
Dudley approaches Spike and raises his fist to strike, Spike
immediately ducks, falls to the ground, and surrenders. Alternately,
suppose officer Fife steps between Dudley and Spike, restraining
and arresting Spike. In each case, Spike or officer Fife interferes
with Dudley's justified use of force by evading it or by rendering
6
it unnecessary and therefore unjustified.'1
Neither Spike nor officer Fife would have been justified if they
had intervened by hitting Dudley. Dudley's justification defense
does not preclude others from justifiably interfering with Dudley's
conduct; rather, it precludes their interfering through force directed
against Dudley. Dudley's defense renders lawful his otherwise

161. See II OXFORD ENGUSH DICnONARY 1462 (compact ed. 1977) (to interfere is "to come
into collision or opposition, so as to affect the course of; . . . to interpose, take part, so as to affect
some action"). Interference implies opposition, but not necessarily violence.
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illegal use of force, and therefore, Dudley's use of force does not
carry the justificatory significance of unlawful force. That is, it
does not justify responsive conduct, such as defensive force, that
would otherwise have been illegal. Others remain free, however, to
interfere with Dudley's justified conduct through actions authorized
by statute (Fife's arrest of Spike) or through behavior that is not
forbidden (Spike's ducking).
In short, justification defenses do not preclude others from
resisting or interfering; rather, they eliminate any justificatory
significance that the actor's conduct would otherwise have had
regarding ordinarily illegal means of resisting or interfering.

Because Dudley's use of force against Spike was justified, it does
not justify the use of otherwise unlawful force by Spike or Fife
against Dudley. Dudley's justification defense does not, however,
preclude interference by means that do not rely on Dudley's force
for their justification. Thus, justified actors can sometimes come
into mutually justified violent conflict with law enforcement
officers precisely because the officers' use of force draws its
justification from statutory authorization and the officers' beliefs
rather than merely from the actors' behavior.
Just as the justification defenses do not categorically preclude
resistance, they do not categorically legitimize assistance. Although
Dudley is justified in assisting Mother Beneficence in defending
herself, he may not do so through any means he pleases. Spike's
attack would not have justified Dudley in ramming the bus he was
driving into Spike and ten innocent bystanders. Similarity, if X
were shooting at Y from a rooftop, Z would be justified in loaning
Y a rifle with which to shoot back but not in blowing up the
building and its occupants. Y's justification does not authorize Z
in assisting Y through any means possible; rather, it renders Y's
use of defensive force legal and therefore precludes accomplice
liability for Z's assistance in that conduct. Y's justification defense
prevents Z's otherwise legal conduct from becoming illegal merely
by virtue of the fact that it constitutes assistance to Y's use of
force. In contrast, any act performed by Z for the purpose of
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promoting an illegal use of force by Y would elicit accomplice
162
liability.
In summary, justification defenses create exceptions to
prohibitory norms, establishing a revised matrix of social
responsibility giving rise to the following set of rights and duties.
First, Z may assist Y in a justified exercise of force against X
without becoming liable merely by virtue of having assisted.
Second, if Z resists or interferes with Y's justified exercise of force
through otherwise illegal means, Z may not justify that conduct by
appealing to Y's use of force. Stated differently, conduct justified
by a justification defense neither grounds accomplice liability for
those who assist through otherwise legal behavior, nor does it
provide justification for those who resist or interfere with the
conduct through otherwise illegal conduct.
3. Hard Cases and the Revised Matrix of Social Responsibility
Dressler challenges the incompatibility thesis with two
additional types of hypothetical cases. The first involves only
innocent parties. A dam collapses, sending a torrent of water
rushing down a valley toward a town populated by 1000 innocent
people. B can save the innocent inhabitants of the town only by
immediately detonating an explosion that will redirect the water
away from the town but toward the innocent C who is farming by

himself in the next valley. B must decide whether to detonate the
explosives causing the death of the innocent C or to refrain from
doing so, resulting in the deaths of the 1000 innocent townspeople.
C accurately perceives the entire situation and sees B reach for the
detonator. C realizes that he can save his own life only by shooting
B before B detonates the explosion. Arguably, this case violates the
incompatibility thesis because the lesser evils defense justifies B in

162. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (addressing
accomplice liability).
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detonating the explosion, and self-defense justifies C in shooting B
in order to prevent B from killing C.1 3
A mechanical application of the revised social matrix as
interpreted above encounters no difficulty with this case. The lesser
evils defense justifies B's action, rendering it legal. Self-defense
justifies force only in response to unlawful exercises of force, and
B's justified act does not fall into this category."6 The revised
social matrix prohibits C's shooting of B in that C's ordinarily
unlawful act of shooting another person can draw no justification
from B's justified act. No conflict of justified acts occurs here
because B is justified while C is not. In order to appreciate the
force of this example, however, one must understand it as a
proposed intuitive counter-example to the social matrix as a
component of conventional social morality. Should a society
require that an innocent party refrain from resisting the sacrifice of
his life to save others? Can one plausibly say that an innocent party
acts wrongfully rather than justifiably in attempting to prevent
others from sacrificing his life?
Consider a modified version of this case. This revised story is
identical to the original with one exception. A third party D rather
than C perceives the situation and must decide whether to allow B
to redirect the water, killing the oblivious C or to shoot B, saving
C but accepting the deaths of B and 1000 townspeople. What
would justify D in rescuing C at the expense of 1001 innocent
lives? All parties are innocent victims of a natural disaster. The
decision apparently involves an unavoidable choice between one
innocent life and 1001, with no additional morally relevant factors
to consider. If D would not be justified in rescuing C at the
expense of 1001 lives in the revised case, what legally recognized

163. This case represents an elaboration of the type of case listed as 5.4 and introduced into
the contemporary justification debate by Dressier, supra note 14, at 89-90. Although some
jurisdictions except homicide from the lesser evils defense, neither the MPC nor Robinson adopt this
exception. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); DEFENSES,
supra note 3, § 124.
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (choice of evils);

iU § 3.04 (self-defense).
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justificatory significance lies in the mere fact that the roles of D
and C reside in the same person in the original story?
Although the framework advanced here accommodates this case
without generating an instance of legally justified violent conflict,
the intuitive discomfort elicited by the case remains. The proposed
resolution is theoretically consistent, but it is simply not fair to C.
Clear cases of fully justified violence, such as Dudley's conduct
toward Spike, demonstrate both internal and external justification,
and this justification is symmetrical. A symmetrically justified act
treats all parties justly, all things considered. That is, no individual
suffers undeserved injury.165 Dudley's conduct elicits intuitive
consensus both because Mother Beneficence is an innocent victim
who merits rescue and because Spike deserves what he gets. Some
cases such as this one involving B and C or those addressing selfdefense against innocent aggressors elicit ambivalent intuitive
responses just because some party suffers undeserved injury
regardless of the choice made.
Perhaps an ideal moral world would be free of undeserved
injury, but justification defenses, and the criminal law generally,
pursue a more modest aim. According to the theory advanced in
this Article, justification defenses exculpate defendants who do not
merit the fourth type of condemnation because they do not violate
a fully articulated prohibitory norm."' Many acts result in
undeserved injury to some party without violating any legal norm.
The malicious launderer Jones, for example, inflicted undeserved
harm on the Smith family without violating any legal norm. 67
Benevolent as well as malevolent actors sometimes inflict
undeserved injury without violating any legal norm. Suppose X
drives legally and carefully along a residential street but hits a
child who darts into the street from between two cars in a manner
that would prevent the most skilled and careful driver from

165. Symmetrical justification arguably rules out windfall benefits as well, but cases involving
justification defenses rarely raise this issue.
166. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussing the five types of condemnation,
including the fourth type which condemns the defendant as one who violated a prohibitory norm as
an accountable agenit).
167. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (describing Jones).
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avoiding her. X causes bodily harm to the innocent child without
fulfilling the culpability requirement for criminal assault or falling
below the standard of reasonable care for tort liability.1 68
The law allows conduct that causes injury to innocent parties
for several reasons. Proscribing conduct that might accidentally
harm innocent people despite due care would require massive
restrictions on individual liberty and economic activity such as
driving and manufacturing. Laws prohibiting all intentional
infliction of suffering on others would require severe sacrifice of
other important values. Proscribing true harmful statements about
others, for example, would entail a marked limitation of free
expression. Finally, some circumstances simply do not provide an
alternative course of action that does not injure some innocent
party. The justification defense provided for defendants who choose
the lesser evil explicitly addresses these cases.
In short, some justified violations of criminal offense definitions
elicit ambivalent intuitive responses because the justification is
asymmetrical, involving undeserved harm to some party, but many
other legal acts elicit similar intuitive responses for the same
reason.169 Justification defenses, like other legal provisions,
sometimes fail to provide symmetrical justification for many
reasons including those discussed. As exceptions to fully articulated
prohibitory norms, justification defenses are unlikely to achieve
complete symmetry unattained by the norms themselves. Conduct
that fulfills a recognized justification defense, like conduct that
violates no offense provision, fails to qualify for the fourth type of
condemnation, even in circumstances in which it results in harm to
an innocent party because it violates no fully articulated prohibitory
norm.

168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (assault); W.
PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 29, 31 (5th ed. 1984)
(regarding unavoidable accidents and due care).
169. Perhaps the most troubling cases are those, such as the flood case described previously,
in which events create circumstances where some innocent parties must suffer and other innocent
parties must decide how to direct that loss. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text
(describing the flood case).
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Clearly, the conventional social morality represented by the
revised social matrix demands much more fortitude of C in the
original story than it demands of D in the revised version because
C must refrain from saving his own life, while D must refrain from
saving C's life. Should C and D both refrain from shooting, most
observers would count D as responsible but C as heroic. Fortitude
and heroism address character, praiseworthiness, and evaluation of
actors, rather than external justification of acts. This case raises
important issues that a fully satisfactory conventional social
morality must address, but these are not issues of justification and
exceptions to prohibitory norms. These issues involve evaluation of
actors and the appropriate role of legal concepts such as excuse and
mitigation in the social response to individuals who encounter
extraordinarily demanding circumstances. Section III regarding
duress returns to these issues.
Dressler's second case involves two parties competing for
scarce and vital resources to which neither has a prior claim. G and
H survive a shipwreck and find themselves adrift at sea with no
means to stay afloat except a single plank floating in the water.
The plank is barely large enough to support one person. Each
person can survive only by attaining sole possession of the plank,
and neither has any prior claim to it nor any prior duty to the other.
Either can release the plank, in which case the party who releases
will die and the other will live. Alternately, both can hold on,
leading to the death of both because the plank will not float with
their combined weight. Finally, each can attempt to take the plank
from the other. Arguably, either is equally justified in securing and
defending the plank from the other, despite the fact that doing so
assures the death of the other. This interpretation justifies both
1 70
sides of the violent confrontation.
This case raises a variety of technical issues. If either party
takes the board from the other, the former will knowingly cause the
death of the latter. If both hold onto the plank, however, both will

170. This case is an elaboration of the type of difficult case listed as 5.3 and introduced into
the contemporary justification debate by Dressier, supra note 14, at 88. The author is putting aside
the alternative of both letting go, and stipulating that no form of sharing will succeed.
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die. It seems, therefore, that each party causes both deaths merely
by holding onto the board and can avoid committing homicide only
by releasing the plank, sacrificing his own life. Yet, neither has any
obvious obligation to sacrifice for the other. Perhaps fairness would
suggest that both parties should hold onto the plank, understanding
that it will not support both, because one person will probably
become exhausted before the other and that person will drown,
leaving the plank to the other, who can survive.
This story elicits conflicting intuitions, but it provides no reason
to favor one party over the other. It seems, therefore, that either
both parties are justified in holding onto the plank or in fighting for
sole possession or neither party is so justified. If one thinks neither
party is justified, this case raises no concern for the original or
revised social matrices or for the incompatibility thesis.17 ' If one
thinks both parties are justified, the justification arises from the
desperate circumstances and the lack of preferable alternatives
rather than from the unjustified conduct of the other because any
circumstances justifying one must also justify the other as they
encounter identical conditions. That is, if both parties are justified,
then they do not justify otherwise illegal conduct by appeal to each
other's justified behavior. Thus, this case remains consistent with
the revised social matrix which precludes justification of otherwise
illegal conduct by appeal to another party's justified conduct. 72
If one thinks that both parties are justified, this case constitutes
a counter-example to the original incompatibility thesis which
denies that both parties in violent conflict can both be justified.
Notice, however, that the term justification has wide and narrow
senses in this area of discourse. In the narrow sense, a justified act
is an otherwise illegal one which is rendered permissible by a
justification defense. In the wide sense, a justified act is one which
is permissible in light of all legally relevant considerations.
Conduct justified in the wide sense includes but is not limited to
conduct justified in the narrow sense. For example, certain acts are

171. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (describing the original matrix and
incompatibility thesis).
172. See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text (discussing the revised social matrix).
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justified in the wide sense, but not the narrow, because they are
authorized by statute or simply because they are not forbidden by
any offense definition. Officer Fife's intervention between Spike
and Dudley is justified by statutory authorization.173 Jones's
is
conduct in driving the Smith family laundry out of business 174
law.
any
violate
not
does
it
that
in
justified in the wide sense
The parties who compete for the plank in this case are justified in
the wide sense, if at all, in that they do not appeal to justification
defenses to justify their conduct. Thus, their conduct is consistent
with the revised social matrix.
The negative aspect of the original social matrix, which
precludes interference in justified conduct, generates the
incompatibility thesis as a corollary.175 The revised social matrix
precludes justification in the narrow sense of otherwise illegal
conduct by appeal to the behavior of other parties which is justified
in the narrow sense. That is, one cannot establish a justification
defense by finding justificatory significance in another's conduct
when that behavior is justified by a justification defense. Selfdefense, for example, legitimizes the use of force only in response
to unlawful aggression.'76 The prison escape cases provide
examples of potential conflict between the prisoner's conduct
which is justified in the narrow sense, by appeal to the choice
among evils, and the official's conduct which is justified in the
wide sense, by the authorizing statute. 177 Athletic contests such
as boxing matches or football games exemplify conflicts among
actors who are justified in the wide sense in that they engage in
legally authorized athletic events. 17' None of these cases violates
the revised social matrix because they do not justify otherwise

173.
174.

See id. (describing Fife's intervention).
See supra note 95-96 and accompanying text (describing the Jones laundry case).

175.

See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing the original matrix and the

incompatibility thesis).
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985). The choice of

evils defense appeals to the harmful effects avoided rather than to lawful or unlawful conduct. Id. §
3.02.

177. See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text (discussing this type of conflict).
178. The author has in mind here, for example, boxing matches conducted under the auspices
of a state boxing commission.
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illegal conduct by appeal to another's behavior which is justified
by a justification defense.
One can imagine bizarre circumstances which arguably
exemplify violent conflicts between parties justified in the narrow
sense. Suppose, for example, that M and N simultaneously pull
knives and launch unprovoked and unlawful attacks at each other
in an elevator. Both are victims of unlawful attacks they cannot
avoid. Both can protect themselves only through defensive
violence. Both were engaged in illegal conduct at the moment that
the other attacked, but neither provoked the others attack through
that illegal behavior.179 Both engaged in unlawful assaults at the
moment they initiated their attacks, but these assaults immediately
became mutually justified exercises of defensive force because each
was the subject of the other's unprovoked assault. If this constitutes
a case of mutually justified self-defense, it serves as a counterexample to the incompatibility thesis, but it remains consistent with
the revised social matrix because both parties justify their conduct
by appeal to the other's illegal assault. This case remains difficult
to interpret because the aggressive acts constitute unprovoked
assaults and externally justified self-defense simultaneously. Thus,
the manner in which one interprets the case depends on the
category one adopts as controlling. Plausible cases of violent
conflict between parties justified in the narrow sense do not seem
to arise.180
In short, the revised social matrix accommodates the troubling
cases. One can identify certain conflicts in which both parties are
justified in the wide sense, but it is difficult to find clear cases of
mutually justified violence in the narrow sense, and it is this
narrow sense which is directly relevant to the theory of justification
defenses because only these cases involve the justificatory force of
justification defenses and conduct that falls within their scope. It is
not clear, however, that the incompatibility thesis fulfills an

179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985)
(discussing provocation in self-defense).
180. Although, having said this, the author is confident that at least one of his more perverse

colleagues will concoct one.
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independent function in the theory of justification defenses. The
original social matrix apparently generates the incompatibility
thesis as a corollary and can address the relevant cases in terms of

the duty not to resist justified conduct without appeal to the
thesis.181 The revised social matrix accommodates the relatively
clear cases, and the difficulty encountered with certain cases such
as those involving G and H (contesting for the plank) or M and N
(attacking in the elevator) reflects ambivalent intuitive judgments
regarding justification. The revised social matrix addresses these
cases without appeal to the incompatibility thesis.
The entire discussion of the technical grounds for liability and
justification in the plank case seems to miss an important aspect of
the dilemma faced by these parties. How can society demand of G
and H that they refrain from struggling for their lives in these
circumstances? Can any social institution reasonably require that
people sacrifice their lives or allow others to sacrifice them in
order to save others? This case, like that of C in the flood case,
raises questions regarding the reasonable limits on the demands any
social institution can make on individuals. Section III advances a
theory of justification defenses grounded in the nature of the moral
condemnation inherent in criminal conviction and punishment. It
accommodates many of the previously identified difficult cases in
a conceptually coherent and morally defensible framework. Section
IV proposes an interpretation of duress as an exculpatory claim of
a type separate from justification or excuse, and it addresses the
remaining difficult cases.
II. DUREss
A. The ClassificationProblem
The duress defense exculpates defendants for offenses they
performed in response to an exercise of, or a threat of, coercive
and unlawful force directed against the defendant by some other

181. See supranotes 137-138 ana accompanying text (discussing the incompatibility thesis as
a corollary of the original matrix).
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party. 182 These defendants commit crimes under circumstances
that would lead many observers to the intuitive judgment that their
offenses were not their fault because others made them behave that
way.

Certain cases raised in the previous sections remain unresolved
by the framework for justification defenses advanced in section H.
These cases share at least some properties with those that qualify
for the duress defense. Although section II addresses the prison
escape cases as candidates for justification, and as difficult cases
raising the issue of mutually justified violent conflict, certain
factors render them arguable candidates for excuse.1 3 Prisoners
who face impending violence experience coercive threats which
would elicit strong fear in most people. If they are unable to secure
reliable official protection in the prison, then many observers might
reasonably think that these defendants 'had no choice,' 'could not
help it,' or 'could not control themselves.' These interpretations
seem particularly apt when applied to individuals who run
impulsively in panic rather than as part of a well-planned escape.
The analysis advanced in section II denies justification to the
innocent C for shooting the innocent B when C realizes that B is
about to redirect the flood waters, killing C in order to save 1000
innocent townspeople. That discussion also recognizes that C would
be heroic, however, if he should accept his fate in the face of such
frightening prospects."8 4 The stranded sailors G and H, who
struggle for the only available plank, arguably engage in unjustified
homicidal conduct toward each other. Many observers who would
deny G and H a legal justification defense might question the
decision to punish them because their circumstances left them no
reasonable alternatives.'85

182. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); DEFENSES, supra
note 3, § 177. In some jurisdictions the coercive force may be directed toward another party. See id.

§ 177(e)(4) (discussing the variations as to the identity of the parties).
183.
cases).
184.
185.

See supra notes 151-161 and accompanying text (discussing prison escape and related
See supra notes 163-170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
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These three types of cases do not present the appropriate
conditions for classic duress claims because the actors do not
engage in their illegal conduct in response to orders from another
party who exercises or threatens to exercise coercive force unless
they comply.' 86 The actors in these three cases encounter
circumstances similar to those encountered by defendants with
standard duress claims, however, in that compliance with the law
would result in severe and undeserved harm. Most people would
probably experience extreme fear in these circumstances, and few
people could confidently say that they would resist that fear in
order to comply with the law.
B. The TheoreticalInterpretation
Although duress is widely established as a criminal defense, the
theoretical explication of the defense remains controversial.' 87
Certain aspects of the defense lend themselves to classification as
a justification while other aspects seem more appropriate to an
excuse. Some commentators have classified the defense as a
88
justification, but most interpret it as an excuse.1
Those who classify duress as an excuse sometimes contend that
this defense applies to defendants who are not culpable for their
offenses because their conduct is not voluntary. Some
commentators contend that those who are subject to severe coercive
pressure to commit a crime have no real choice or are unable to
control themselves; their wills are overborne by the force or threats
of force. 189 These claims remain extremely difficult to explicate.
The conduct in question fulfills the voluntary act requirement,'9"
and the actors suffer no disorder such as paralysis or convulsion
that severs the usual association between individual behavior and

186. DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 177(e)(5).
187. Id. § 177(a) (documenting the wide-spread acceptance).
188. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 123, § 5.3 (duress as choice of evils justification); Dressier,
supra note 47, at 1349-67 (reviewing the justification and excuse interpretations).
189. RErmwNo, supra note 3, at 831; DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 177(a).
190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (requiring a
voluntary act in the technical sense of the term).
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psychological process such as deliberation and decision. Defendants
raise the duress defense regarding conduct performed in an
organized, goal directed, and often efficient manner.' 91
For this reason, Herbert Fingarette rejects the interpretation of
duress as a claim of involuntariness, advancing an alternative
interpretation of duress as a species of victimization. According to
Fingarette, X victimizes Y, giving rise to a duress defense for Y,
when X wrongfully intervenes in the situation in order to
manipulate Y into performing the crime by making it appear to be
the reasonable thing to do. Y should be excused from the burden
ordinarily associated with the crime because Y is the victim who
acts reasonably under the circumstances. 192 Fingarette's account
of duress as victimization provides an interesting analysis of the
relationship between the defendant and the victimizer who exerts
the coercive force. This relationship arguably lies at the center of
the historical defense. In addition, it illuminates the relationship
between duress and other variations of victimization which carry
legal significance. 93
Although victimization places duress in an interesting
framework within which one can study its relationships to other
legal issues, it does not provide an adequate formulation of duress
as a criminal justification or excuse. Fingarette sometimes presents
the victimized defendant as acting reasonably in the circumstances,
but in other passages he describes the defendant as one who acts
in a manner that appears reasonable to the defendant.' 94 This
issue seems to parallel the distinction raised earlier in this paper
between external and internal justification and, therefore, between
justification and excuse.' 95 If the victimizer's intervention
actually renders the defendant's conduct reasonable by systemic
standards, why does duress excuse rather than justify the conduct
191.

H. Fingarette, tictimization:A LegalistAnalysisof Coercion,Deception, UndueInfluence,

and Excusable Prison Escape, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 65, 71-82 (1985).
192. Id. at 66, 82-86, 105-14. This account would also apply to cases in which X tricks Y into
committing a crime.
193. Id. at 86-104.
194. Compare id. at 66, 86, 104, 108, 117 with iU.at 105, 110-13.
195. See supra notes 119-128 and accompanying text (discussing internal and external
justification).
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as the lesser evil? Alternately, if it renders the conduct reasonable
only in terms of the defendant's personal interests and standards,
why would it have any affect on the status of the criminal conduct
from the perspective of the criminal law? Finally, if the
victimization only causes the offensive conduct to appear
reasonable to the defendant, how does duress differ from the
excuse provided for mistake regarding justification? t9 6 .
Perhaps most importantly, the victimization interpretation fails
to accommodate an important subset of plausible duress cases in
which the defendant realizes that the criminal conduct is not
reasonable. Suppose K runs a day-care center where he takes care
of several pre-school children, including his own. Mobsters enter
the center, place a gun at the head of K's child and threaten to kill
the child unless K identifies the children of a rival mobster on
whom they intend to take revenge by killing his children. By
identifying the mobster's two children, K trades two innocent lives
for one. K's act would not satisfy the requirements of a lesser evils
justification, but K would have a plausible argument for the duress
defense.19 7 This argument would remain plausible, and perhaps
even become more persuasive, however, if K admitted that he acted
believing that his conduct was not reasonable, but "I was just too
scared to say no." Perhaps the most intuitively credible duress
defendants are those who suffer guilt and remorse for their action,
admitting they knew they were doing wrong when they performed
the criminal conduct but claiming they were so frightened that they
did it anyway.
Dressler advances an interpretation of duress as an excuse that
captures difficult duress cases such as K's and addresses the feature
that cases 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 have in common with duress.'98
Dressler contends that duress is the excuse provided by the
criminal justice system for those who commit crimes because they

196. DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 184(a) (mistake regarding justification); see supra notes 129136 and accompanying text (discussing putative justification).
197. Recall that neither the MPC nor Robinson adopt the homicide exception. See MODn
PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985); DEFENSES, supra note 3, §

177(g)(1).
198.

1304

See supra § I summary case list (identifying cases 5.2, 5.3, 5.4).

1993 / JustificationDefenses And Just Convictions
encounter conditions demanding more courage than society can
fairly demand of its citizens. In Dressler's view, defendants who
raise the duress defense each claim "I am only human," and society
exculpates them because they committed their crimes in response
to threats that persons of "nonsaintly" moral strength cannot be
expected to withstand.'9 9 This formulation captures the plea
advanced by K regarding his identification of the mobster's
children. 'I knew I should not give up two innocents to save one,'
K explains, 'but I am only human; I was too frightened of what
would happen to my child if I refused them, as I knew I should.'
Similarly the escaping prisoners in example 5.2, the innocent
farmer C in case 5.4, and the stranded sailors in example 5.3 all
faced circumstances which arguably demanded more of them than
a society can reasonably expect." °
Although Dressler's formulation of duress captures the intuitive
significance of the circumstances that give rise to many claims of
duress, it remains difficult to reconcile with an integrated system
of excuses. Robinson contends that excuses conform to a basic
structure consisting of a disability giving rise to an excusing
condition. The disability is some abnormal condition of the
individual which differentiates that person from the population in
general and causes the excusing condition. The excusing condition,
such as impairment in the actors' ability to voluntarily control their
conduct or to understand the nature of their conduct, renders them
not blameworthy for their illegal behavior.2"'
Defendants who qualify for excuses do not merit the fourth
02

type of condemnation expressed by criminal punishment.

Individuals who suffer disabilities such as severe psychopathology
or mental subnormality, which give rise to excusing conditions,

199. Dressier, supra note 47, at 1334, 1363-67.
200. Although Fletcher frames the excuse as one of involuntariness or overborne will,
Dressler's interpretation is consistent with Fletcher's formulation of the issue as asking whether the
defendant could 'be fairly expected to resist." See RETrHiNO, supranote 3, at 834-35 (discussing
Fletcher's view).
201. DEFENSEs, supra note 3, §§ 25, 161.

202.

See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (describing the five types of condemnation,

including the fourth type condemning the defendant as one who violated a prohibitory norm as an
accountable agent).
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lack the capacities of rational agency, at least regarding their
203
conduct that violated the fully articulated prohibitory norm.
Those who lack the capacities of rational agency do not violate the
dictates of the criminal law as accountable agents, and hence the
courts cannot appropriately subject them to the fourth type of
condemnation which inheres in criminal punishment.
Certain excuses exculpate defendants who do not suffer
disabilities giving rise to excusing conditions. Reasonable mistakes
regarding justification, for example, exculpate those who act on
those mistakes under the excuse discussed previously as putative
justification. 4 Although these defendants lack disabilities,
situational factors render their mistakes reasonable and undermine
attributions of culpability. These defendants possess the capacities
of rational agency, but their illegal conduct is not appropriately
attributed to them in their status as accountable agents because
their nonculpable mistakes prevented them from bringing their
capacities of accountable agency to bear on their decision to
engage in that conduct. Their action-plans, which represent them as
accountable agents, did not include the conduct which fulfills the
objective offense elements." 5 These defendants do not merit the
fourth type of condemnation because they did not violate the
criminal law in their status as accountable agents, although they
generally possess the relevant capacities.
Duress defendants, in contrast to those who claim disability or
mistake based excuses, possess the capacities of accountable agents
and they have the knowledge which provides the opportunity to
exercise those capacities. They act on action-plans which include
the acts exemplifying the objective offense elements as intended
components. Although excuses usually exculpate defendants who
suffer some disability that differentiates them from most people,
the "person of reasonable firmness" clause in the duress provision
of the MPC appeals to the similarity between the defendant's

203. ScHopp, supra note 11, § 6.5 (discussing psychological disorder and the capacities of
agency).

204.

See supra notes 129-136 and accompanying text (regarding putative justification).

205. See supra notes 104-112 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and significance
of action-plans).
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behavior and that which would have been expected from most
reasonable people.2" This focus on situational factors and criteria
generalizable across persons ordinarily applies more appropriately
to justifications than to excuses." 7
As usually formulated, duress apparently combines properties
of justification and of excuse, yet it qualifies as neither. Many
crimes committed under conditions that raise plausible duress
claims do not qualify for justification because the defendants did
not engage in conduct that society approves or encourages.2 "8 The

day-care operator K and the innocent fanner C (in case 5.4), for
example, each promote the greater harm by sacrificing two or more
innocent lives in order to save one. Yet neither suffers a disability
or excusing condition that would ground an excuse other than
duress.
Robinson identifies the state of coercion and the resultant
inability to control behavior as the disability and excusing
condition, respectively.2" As discussed previously, however,
many duress defendants violate the law through organized,
efficient, goal-directed conduct, demonstrating no indication of
impaired ability to control their actions.210 Disabilities are
abnormal conditions of actors, but a "state of coercion" does not
constitute a condition of an individual.'
Coercion is "the
application of force to control the action of a voluntary agent," and
to coerce is "[t]o constrain or restrain (a voluntary or moral agent)
by the application of superior force." 2 Thus, a state of coercion
is not a condition of an actor but rather a relationship between an
actor and a source of power, usually another person or group. As

206. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (addressing the
person of reasonable firmness); DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 177(a).
207. RETHINKING, supra note 3, at 761-62.
208. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
justification and excuse).
209. DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 177(c).
210. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Robinson describes the excusing condition
as comparable to the volitional component of some insanity standards. DEFENSES, supra note 3, §
177(c); see SCHOPP, supra note 11, at 165-76 (analyzing these standards as vacuous).
211. DEFENSES, supra note 3, § 25(b)(1) (regarding the disability).
212. II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 457 (compact ed. 1977).
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such, it may carry exculpatory force, but it does not constitute a
disability as Robinson defines it, nor is it a defective capacity
similar to those that ground insanity or mental subnormality
excuses.
These arguments do not deny the intuitive moral force of the
coercive circumstances that raise strong claims of duress, but they
raise serious question about the accuracy of classifying duress as
an excuse as that category is usually understood. Defendants who
raise this defense demonstrate neither standard excusing conditions
nor disabilities that differentiate them from the general population.
Duress does not undermine the fourth type of condemnation
expressed by criminal punishment because these defendants possess
the capacities of accountable agents, and they have the knowledge
required to apply those capacities to the decision at hand. The
"person of reasonable firmness" provision appeals to the similarity
between these actors and most others rather than to any condition
that differentiates them.213 The intuitive judgement that these
people do not deserve punishment arises not from justification or
excuse, but rather from the recognition that only saints or heros
would have resisted the coercive circumstances they encountered.
An adequate theory of duress should reflect the difference between
this intuitive judgment and the corresponding intuitions underlying
justification and excuse.

C. Systemically Complete Mitigation
The criminal law ordinarily addresses wrongful conduct
committed by responsible agents under difficult circumstances
through mitigation in sentencing. By mitigating the degree of
punishment, the law recognizes the defendant as less blameworthy
for any of several reasons including unusually difficult
circumstances.214 If defendants raise the duress defense as a claim

213.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (discussing

duress).
214. Id § 7.01(2) (listing mitigating factors relevant to sentencing); H.L.A. HART, PuNisWlfnNr
AD REspoNsmuriw 14-16 (1968).
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of mitigation, rather than excuse, they contend that they deserve
less punishment than most people who commit similar offenses
because they are less blameworthy.
The criminal law constitutes a substantial component in the
conventional morality adopted by a society as the framework
required for cooperative social interaction. The role of mitigation
in this framework differs significantly from that of excuse.
Defendants who assert excuses contend that they did not act in the
capacity of systemically accountable agents because they lacked
either the capacities of rational agency or the knowledge required
to apply those capacities to the behavior in question.215 Those
who assert mitigating conditions, in contrast, acknowledge their
standing as accountable agents but contend that certain recognized
conditions render them less blameworthy than those who commit
similar offenses under ordinary circumstances. When compliance
with the law would require exceptional discipline or fortitude, they
contend, then the blameworthiness and appropriate punishment of
those who fail to comply decreases just as the praise deserved by
those who comply increases. Mitigation ordinarily reduces the
severity of punishment, however, rendering it apparently inadequate
for K (the day-care operator), C (in the flood case), G and H
(contesting the plank), and other defendants who act in
circumstances that seem intuitively to render any punishment
excessive.
If the criminal law represents the conventional social morality
that we need for cooperative interaction, then one who is not

blameworthy by the standards of the criminal law is not necessarily
one who merits no blame at all by the most stringent moral
standards, but rather one who displays the degree of moral
discipline and fortitude that citizens must generally exercise in
order to maintain the cooperative social process. Just as the
criminal law does not forbid every type of wrongful conduct that
critical morality would prohibit, it does not require the degree of
moral discipline and fortitude that an ideal critical morality would

215. See supranotes 83,94 and accompanying text (discussing the fourth type of condemnation
as applied to excuses).
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demand. Rather, the criminal law should proscribe those types of
conduct which if generally engaged in would prevent effective
social cooperation, and it should require the level of discipline and
fortitude that citizens must generally exercise in order to maintain
social cooperation.
Defendants who violate criminal proscriptions under
extraordinarily coercive circumstances might commit unjustified
and unexcused offenses despite exercising the degree of discipline
and fortitude required by the conventional social morality. Recall
K, who identified the mobster's two children to protect his own
child, and C, who killed B in order to prevent B from redirecting
the flood away from the town and toward C. 216 Neither K nor C
qualifies for a justification defense because each sacrificed two or
more lives in order to protect one. Neither suffered any disability
or lack of information that would support an excuse. The degree of
fortitude required for compliance with the law in circumstances
such as those encountered by K and C, however, may well exceed
that which the criminal law generally requires in order to maintain
cooperative interaction. Rarely must citizens sacrifice their own
lives or those of loved ones in order to maintain a cooperative
society.
On this view, the criminal law defines and enforces the degree
of individual discipline and fortitude required to maintain
cooperative social interaction by punishing those who fall below
this level while committing unjustified and unexcused offenses.
Offenders who fail to exercise the required discipline and fortitude
are blameworthy by the standard of the conventional social
morality and subject to punishment. Circumstances that demand
unusual discipline and fortitude mitigate blameworthiness, reducing
the appropriate punishment in criminal justice systems that punish
in proportion to blameworthiness. Extraordinary circumstances may
elevate the level of discipline and fortitude required for compliance
beyond that which the conventional social morality demands for
cooperative social interaction. People who confront such

216. See supranotes 196-197 and accompanying text (describing K); supranotes 163-165 and
accompanying text (describing C).
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extraordinary circumstances might exercise more discipline and
fortitude than a society can reasonably demand, yet fail to
successfully resist the coercive pressure. K, C, G, H, and others
who commit offenses in response to such extreme circumstances
are not blameworthy by the standards of the conventional morality
because they have not fallen below the level of discipline and
fortitude required by those standards.
These offenders are neither justified nor excused, yet they are
not appropriately subject to punishment in a system that punishes
in proportion to blameworthiness because they are not blameworthy
by systemic standards. As usually understood, legal punishment
involves harsh treatment of an offender, for an offense,
administered by an authority in such a manner as to express moral
condemnation." 7 The harsh treatment usually takes a form, such
as incarceration, that expresses condemnation in that society, and
the severity of the punishment is usually intended to reflect the
degree of condemnation deserved by the offender.2" 8 Individuals
who commit offenses under extremely demanding circumstances
merit conviction by the standards of the criminal justice system
because they have fulfilled the offense elements without
justification or excuse; however, they do not deserve punishment
in a retributive system that punishes in proportion to
blameworthiness because they are not blameworthy by the
standards of the conventional social morality, which does not
29
require heroic discipline and fortitude. 1
217. HART, supra note 214, at 4-5; FEINBERG, supra note 78, at 95-118.
218. FEINBERo, supra note 78, at 98-101 (discussing the form of punishment as expressive).
219. I will not attempt to develop a complete theory of blameworthiness here. Some readers
might contend, for example, that the degree of blameworthiness varies directly with the harmfulness
of the offense committed and inversely with the severity of the coercive threats encountered. Others
might argue that the severity of the coercive threat determines the degree of mitigation, while the
harmfulness of the offense committed is relevant only to justification. One who endorses the former
theory would contend that the blameworthiness of an actor such as K or C varies with the number
of deaths they must cause, while an advocate of the latter theory would mitigate their
blameworthiness in proportion to their threat, regardless of the number of deaths caused. On either

theory, however, blameworthiness remains the central issue in mitigation, and sufficient external

coercion can require such extraordinary discipline and fortitude as to render some offenders not
blameworthy for some offenses by the standards of the conventional morality. For further discussion
of blameworthiness and desert, see J. Feinberg, Justiceand PersonalDesert,in FEINBERG, supra note
78, at 55-94; GEORGE SHma, DESERT (1987).
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When extraordinary circumstances render the defendant
inappropriate for blame by the standards of the system but do not
provide any justification or excuse, then mitigation completely
precludes the harsh treatment that expresses condemnation within
the system, but it does not preclude conviction. Defendants who
commit crimes under these conditions merit systemically complete
mitigation leading to conviction without the harsh treatment that
constitutes part of legal punishment. Conviction without harsh
treatment would serve an important expressive purpose by
vindicating the law that proscribes acts of these types, as defined
at the level of generality available in the penal code, and by
vindicating the standing of innocent victims by acknowledging that
they were wronged. These purely vindicating convictions would
also recognize, however, that the defendant acted under conditions
such that they were not blameworthy by the standards
of the
220
conventional morality represented by the criminal law.
Purely vindicating convictions differ significantly from
suspended sentences. Courts sometimes sentence defendants to a
conventional term of years but suspend that sentence pending
successful completion of a period of probation. 221 Courts
ordinarily suspend a sentence in favor of probation for a variety of
reasons including: The defendant is not considered dangerous; the
defendant has a job and a family to support; the defendant is a
promising candidate for rehabilitation; or the facilities for
incarceration are overcrowded.222 In contrast to a purely
vindicating conviction, a suspended sentence marks the defendant
as blameworthy to the degree represented by the severity of that

220. Although this article specifically advocates the interpretation of duress as systemically
complete mitigation leading to purely vindicating conviction, duress does not exhaust the appropriate
scope of this approach. The innocent farmer C and the stranded sailors G and H do not qualify for
duress as usually formulated, but they provide plausible candidates for systemically complete
mitigation. Some codes, courts, and commentators categorize entrapment as a nonexculpatory policy
defense, while others classify it as a form of excuse. If one understands entrapment as exculpatory,
rather that as purely policy based, it may fit the pattern of mitigation better than that of excuse. I will
not attempt an analysis of entrapment here. See DEFENsEs,supra note 3, at § 209; LAFAvE & Scowt,
supra note 123, § 5.2 (discussing entrapment).
221. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.02, 7.01 (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (addressing
the basis for suspended sentences and probation).
222. Id. § 7.01(2).
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suspended sentence. Probation serves as a social instrument applied
by the court for purposes of social policy and is revokable by the
court upon violation of conditions precisely because the suspended
sentence has been identified as the harsh treatment deserved by the
blameworthy defendant.223 According to usual practice, courts
apply probation and suspended sentences as a matter of mercy,
efficiency, or social policy.224 In contrast, the purely vindicating
convictions advocated here reflect considerations of justice
grounded in blameworthiness and desert.
In some cases, courts may suspend sentences because they think
that the defendant is not blameworthy and does not deserve harsh
treatment for an offense committed in response to provocation or
fear. One advantage of recognizing purely vindicating convictions
as a separate type of verdict is that they would allow courts to treat
these defendants differently than those who are blameworthy but
receive suspended sentences for policy reasons. This alternative
would enable the court to convict and release without suspended
sentence, avoiding the inconsistency of setting a sentence that
ostensibly measures blameworthiness and then releasing on
suspended sentence because the defendant is not blameworthy.
D. Two Potential Criticisms
Potential critics might raise two objections to the proposed
purely vindicating convictions. First, they might claim that this
practice is inconsistent in that it implicitly asserts both that these

defendants are appropriate subjects of condemnation and that they
are not. Purely vindicating convictions vindicate just because they
represent social condemnation of the defendant's conduct, they
might contend, yet we withhold the harsh treatment on the premise
that these defendants are not sufficiently blameworthy to merit the
condemnation represented by punishment. Second, some critics
might deny that exculpation under excuse differs from mitigation

223. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, THE LAW Op SENTENCING §§ 5.1,5.3 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing
social policies underlying probation and conditions of probation).
224. Id. § 5.1 (discussing social policies favoring probation).
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to purely vindicating conviction. In either case, the verdict rejects
the claim that the act is justified but exempts the actor from
punishment.
Neither of these two potential criticisms accurately applies to
the proposed purely vindicating conviction. This proposal avoids
contradiction because the apparent inconsistency actually reflects
the complexity of the institution of punishment. Any particular case
of legal punishment involves the application of a complex social
institution of punishment to a particular person for a particular
offense.'
In order to establish rules of relatively broad
generality, the institution must define both offenses and conditions
of culpability in terms of relatively broad properties that do not
capture every morally significant factor.
Purely vindicating convictions reflect the separate functions of
justification, excuse, and mitigation within the conventional
morality represented by the criminal law, and they provide a legal
devise through which officials can express the social judgement
relevant to this conventional morality in a more precise manner.
Vindicating convictions ratify the systemic prohibition of acts of
the type performed by the defendants as defined at the level of
generality available to the system, and they recognize these
defendants as accountable agents who have committed offenses as
defined by the code. 26 These convictions also vindicate the
standing of innocent victims by explicitly denouncing the criminal
conduct. They withhold harsh treatment, however, in recognition of
the specific factors that rendered conformity in these cases so
difficult as to demand discipline and fortitude beyond that required
by the conventional social morality."2 7
In short, purely vindicating convictions reaffirm systemic
condemnation of acts of the type performed by the defendant but
refrain from condemning this defendant as blameworthy for this

225. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing punishment at the levels of
institution and application).
226. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing the first and fourth types of
condemnation as inherent in criminal punishment).

227. See supra notes 216-224 and accompanying text (discussing duress as a defense addressing
cases requiring extraordinary discipline and fortitude).
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particular act due to the extremely demanding circumstances. As
such, they provide a special legal devise for addressing defendants
who commit offenses under conditions that warrant the first and
fourth types of condemnation inherent in criminal punishment, but
who do not merit the fifth type of condemnation as morally
blameworthy by systemic standards.22 These convictions provide
us with an official procedure for communicating to the defendant,
you are a responsible person, and acts of the type you performed
are prohibited, but we realize both that under those conditions we
probably would have done the same thing and that cooperative
social interaction does not require heroism.
Although purely vindicating conviction and excuse both exempt
the actor from harsh treatment without approving of the act as
permissible, they are not interchangeable. Excuses exempt
defendants who manifest excusing conditions due to disabilities that
undermine their status as accountable agents who are appropriately
subject

to

punishment.22 9

In

contrast,

purely

vindicating

conviction provides a method for explicitly recognizing those
situations in which responsible actors fail to conform to the law for
reasons that neither justify their acts nor undermine their status as
accountable agents, but which render punishment inappropriate in
a system representing the conventional social morality required for
cooperative social interaction. Categorizing these cases as excuses
distorts them by directing attention away from the highly
significant circumstances and toward nonexistent disabilities.
Some potential critics might argue that K (the day-care
operator) and C (the victim of the redirected flood) suffer
disabilities in that they lack the capacities needed to conform in
these circumstances. This claim distorts the relevant notions of
responsibility and disability. The disability that grounds an excuse
must differentiate excusable defendants from the general population
and give rise to an accepted excusing condition.230 Ordinarily,
these disabilities deprive the offender of the capacities identified by

228.
229.
230.

See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing the five types of condemnation).
DEFENsEs, supra note 3, § 161 (analyzing the structure of excuses).
Ma.§ 161(a).
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Hart as capacity-responsibility. 3 1 On this understanding,
"capacity-responsibility" refers to competence for a particular role;
that is, the role of a citizen with the ability to participate as an
accountable agent in the conventional social morality represented
by the criminal law. 232 Individuals posses the relevant capacities
to greater or lesser degrees, and to say of persons that they are
responsible in this sense is to say that they possess these capacities
at least to the degree that we ordinarily require of persons before
we hold them accountable under the law. Actors suffer disabilities
relevant to these capacities when their level of ability falls below
this norm defined by the minimally accountable citizen. Thus, the
assertion that an actor who possesses the capacities of ordinary
citizens suffers a disability because he fails to successfully conform
in unusually difficult circumstances distorts this usual conception
of capacity-responsibility by misrepresenting extraordinarily
demanding circumstances as defective capacities.
In addition to distorting the relevant concepts, categorizing
duress as an excuse distorts the expression of condemnation
inherent in conviction and punishment, denigrating certain
defendants and misleading concerned citizens. Justifications and
excuses preclude conviction and punishment by rendering
inappropriate the fourth type of condemnation ordinarily expressed
by legal punishment.233 Justifications do so by creating
exceptions to the prohibitory norms. Thus, actors who engage in
justified violations of offense definitions do not violate fully
articulated prohibitory norms. Excused actors violate such norms,
but they do not do so in their capacity as accountable agents by
systemic standards. Those who do not merit this fourth type of
condemnation do not merit conviction and punishment which
inherently expresses this type of condemnation.

231. See HART, supra note 214, at 227-30 (describing actors as responsible in this sense if they
possess the capacities of understanding, reasoning, and control of their movement that enable most
people to conform to the law).
232. Id. at 227-30 (recognizing capacity-responsibility as a necessary condition for moral

liability and for criminal liability in most systems).
233.
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Defendants who qualify only for duress, in contrast, violate
fully articulated norms as accountable agents.234 Extraordinary
circumstances undermine attribution of blameworthiness relevant
to the fifth type of condemnation which is ordinarily expressed by
punishment. These cases and systemically complete mitigation
reveal the inadequacy of the previous explication of the
condemnation inherent in punishment.235 According to that
analysis, the only type of condemnation inherent in all institutions
of punishment is the condemnation of act-types which occurs at the
institutional level through the articulation of offense definitions.
The fourth type of condemnation also inheres in conviction and
punishment by any criminal justice system that is retributive in the
minimal sense that it limits punishment to those who fulfill criteria
of accountability. This analysis did not include the fifth type of
condemnation among those inherent in punishment.
The formulation of duress as systemically complete mitigation
suggests a more complete analysis of the fifth type of
condemnation. Judges and jurors make determinations regarding
both conviction and sentencing and they apply both personal and
systemic criteria of blameworthiness. Conviction does not imply
blameworthiness by either personal or systemic criteria. It does not
imply that the defendant is blameworthy by the personal standards
of the trier of fact because each trier's personal moral standards
may differ from the legal criteria for the reasons discussed
previously.236 Thus, triers of fact who make a serious effort to set
aside their personal standards in favor of those contained in judicial
instructions will sometimes bring verdicts that do not reflect their
personal moral standards. It does not imply blameworthiness by
systemic criteria because the criminal justice system addresses
factors contributing to blameworthiness other than accountability
Q

234. The word "only" in this sentence rules out cases in which the defendant also qualifies for
excuse (e.g., subnormality) or justification (e.g., lesser evils).
235. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (analyzing the types of condemnation
inherent in punishment).
236. See supranotes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing the potential differences between
legal standards and individual moral standards).
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through mitigating and aggravating considerations relevant to
sentencing rather than through complete defenses.237
Punishment does not imply blameworthiness by personal
standards for the same reasons that prevent conviction from doing
so.23 Punishment implies blameworthiness by systemic standards,
however, in retributive institutions that distribute punishment in
proportion to blameworthiness because such a system cannot
administer the harsh treatment that constitutes part of punishment
to a defendant who is not blameworthy by systemic standards. That
is, any punishment must imply blameworthiness by systemic
standards in a retributive institution that punishes in proportion to
blameworthiness. Thus, punishment by a criminal justice system
which is retributive in this sense implies blameworthiness by the
systemic criteria, but circumstances which demand discipline and
fortitude beyond the level required by these criteria undermine the
attribution of blameworthiness. Purely vindicating convictions
provide courts in these retributive systems with a devise for
addressing those cases in which the defendants violate fully
articulated norms as accountable agents but do not merit
condemnation as blameworthy by systemic criteria. In this manner,
these convictions enable the court to articulate more precisely the

judgment of the conventional social morality represented by the
criminal justice system.
Some readers might accept the argument for systemically
complete mitigation but contend that it should be categorized as a
separate type of defense leading to acquittal rather than to purely
vindicating convictions. Although such an interpretation would
preserve the basic analysis of justification and duress advanced in
this article, I prefer the fully vindicating conviction for the
following reasons. As presently developed, our criminal justice
system addresses circumstances that increase or decrease
blameworthiness for a particular 'crime through aggravation in

237. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (listing
mitigating circumstances used in sentencing); CAMPBELL, supranote 223, § 4 (discussing aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in sentencing).
238. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing potential differences between
legal and individual moral standards).
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sentencing."9 Current defenses which address defendant
culpability, broadly construed, exculpate defendants either because
they have not violated a fully articulated prohibitory norm by
committing a legal offense, or because they have not done so a's
responsible agents. Failure-of-proof defenses address those who
have not committed legal offenses.24 Justifications exculpate
those who have not violated fully articulated prohibitory
norms.24 Excuses exclude those who do not violate the norms as
responsible agents.24 2 The approach advanced in section IV
promotes conceptual consistency with this framework by
classifying systemically complete mitigation as a sentencing issue
rather than as a defense.
The purely vindicating conviction retains the explicit
condemnation of this type of conduct at the systemic level, possibly
enhancing the ability of many people, especially innocent victims,
to accept the outcome. The vindicating conviction also affirms the
broader structure by explicitly confirming the defendant's status as
an accountable agent by systemic standards. Finally, the vindicating
conviction recognizes the separate expressive functions of
conviction and punishment in retributive institutions. That is,

conviction condemns a particular type of conduct by an
accountable agent, and punishment expresses the degree of
blameworthiness attributable to 'that agent. Some might suggest, of
course, that the entire current framework ought to be revised, but
that issue extends well beyond the scope of this article.243
The classification of duress and similar cases within the broader
framework of the criminal law carries significance beyond the

239. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2) (Official Draft & Revised Comments 1985) (listing
mitigating circumstances used in sentencing); CAMPBELL, supra note 223, § 4 (discussing aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in sentencing).
240. See supra notes 113-127 and accompanying text (discussing failure-of-proof defenses).
241. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing justifications as undermining
the fourth type of condemnation).
242. See supra notes 83, 94 and accompanying text (discussing excuses as undermining the
fourth type of condemnation).
243. See, e.g., KARL MENNiNER, THE CRIAE OF PuNIsHMENT (1968); BARBARA WOOTrON,
CR mE AND THE CRIMwNAL LAw (1963) (both authors question the entire conceptual and normative
structure of criminal responsibility as an institution of social regulation).
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quest for conceptual consistency. The currently dominant
classification of duress as an excuse denigrates the identified
defendants by misrepresenting them as lacking the capacities of
accountable agents. Perhaps most importantly from the perspective
of the expressive function of the criminal law, excusing these
actors encourages the rest of us to mislead ourselves in a selfindulgent manner because it allows us to direct our attention
toward the putative defects suffered by these particular individuals
without confronting the uncomfortable likelihood that they acted as
they did not because they differ from us but rather because they are
very much like us.244
CONCLUSION

This Article advances a theoretical framework for the analysis
of justification defenses as part of an integrated system of criminal
law. The theory calls upon the condemnation inherent in conviction
and punishment, the prospective and retrospective functions of
justifications, and the distinction between internal and external
justification as broad organizing principles for the analysis of these
defenses. Courts rely on justification defenses retrospectively in
order to identify conduct which is exempt from the conviction and
punishment authorized by the general prohibitory norms as
represented by the objective elements of offense definitions.
Individuals rely on these defenses prospectively when they select
action-plans in order to avoid those which include acts
exemplifying fully articulated criminal proscriptions.
Those who act within the scope of justification defenses do not
merit the condemnation inherent in criminal punishment. Legal
conviction and punishment ordinarily expresses condemnation at
five levels, but only the first type of condemnation, expressed at
the institutional level by the proscription of certain act-types as
criminal offenses, inheres in the institution of legal punishment.
Specific applications of punishment in a retributive system also
express condemnation of the actors who have violated fully
244.
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articulated prohibitory norms as accountable agents by systemic
standards. Justification defenses exempt certain defendants who do
not merit this type of condemnation because their actions do not
violate a fully articulated norm.
Excuses, in contrast, exculpate those who violate such a norm
but not in the capacity of accountable agents. Some excused
defendants lack the capacities required to qualify them as
accountable agents, while others lack the knowledge that would
provide the opportunity to apply these capacities to the decision to
perform the proscribed conduct. This latter group's action-plan
selection is internally justified by the reasons they are aware of,
although their conduct is not externally justified by all the relevant
reasons that actually apply.
Justification defenses apply only to conduct which is externally
justified and thus exempted from the fully articulated prohibitory
norm. Justified behavior is permissible because it is not forbidden,
although the actors who perform such conduct may be blameworthy
if they are not internally justified. Putative justification excuses
those actors who are internally justified in the selection of their
action-plans which represent them as moral agents. Justifications
create a matrix of social responsibility in that conduct justified by
a justification defense neither grounds accomplice liability for those
who assist through otherwise legal behavior, nor does it provide
justification for those who resist or interfere through otherwise
illegal conduct. This social matrix does not logically preclude the
possibility of mutually justified violent conflict, although plausible
cases of mutually justified violence are extremely difficult to
devise.
Duress has traditionally been very difficult to classify as either
a justification or an excuse, and so it should remain because it is
neither. Duress represents part of a broader set of cases which
should be subject to systemically complete mitigation resulting in
purely vindicating convictions. In a retributive system that punishes
in proportion to blameworthiness, this approach would
accommodate defendants who do not merit blame by systemic
standards and thus do not merit one type of condemnation inherent
in punishment by these retributive systems.
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